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7 HIS article covers cases from 115 S.W.3d through 142 S. W3d and
346 F.3d through 385 F.3d, which the authors believed were note-
-1 worthy by adding to the jurisprudence on the applicable subject.
The authors acknowledge the assistance of Nichole Berklas, Jeanne
Caruselle, Adam Darowki, Noelle Garsek, Ryan Harris, Katie Kildebeck,
Jason Marshall, Rob Pivnick, Jimmy Schnurr, Tracy Scoggin, Lisa Smith,
David Staas and Doug Sweet for the initial review and drafting of a portion
of this article.
I. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
In Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Cook,1 Cook, the spouse of the
grantor under a deed of trust against their homestead, brought a declara-
tory judgment action against Chase, the successor-in-interest to the origi-
nal lienholder, claiming that Chase's interest was void against her
homestead. While numerous issues were discussed, only the viability of
the renewal and extension of a prior lien is relevant to this discussion. In
1992, Mr. Cook purchased two lots, then subsequently contracted for the
construction of a home on the lots. Seven years later, Mr. Cook obtained
a $54,900 mortgage loan from Irwin Mortgage Corporation and executed
a deed of trust securing the loan. At trial, Mrs. Cook contended that the
deed of trust did not meet the requirements to establish a lien against her
homestead, since it did not fall within any of the constitutionally man-
dated requirements for a homestead. 2 Chase had no basis to sustain its
claim, except under the refinancing of a homestead lien, and asserted that
position at trial. The basis for such a claim was a renewal and extension
rider in the deed of trust stating that the note was a renewal and exten-
sion of a prior $57,600 note executed by Mr. Cook in favor of Security
State Bank secured by a previously recorded deed of trust. In fact, the
note to Security State Bank was in the amount of only $5,760, and this
note had been paid off in 1996, three years prior to the execution of the
subject deed of trust. The court of appeals pointed out that while exten-
sions and renewals of existing homestead liens can be extended, once a
prior lien has been dissolved by payment, it cannot support a renewal and
extension for the benefit of the current lien.3
Numerous foreclosure issues were raised in Stanley v. Citifinancial
Mortgage Co.;4 however, most were dismissed on summary judgment mo-
1. 141 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.). Also discussed in Sec-
tion XIII, infra, on homesteads.
2. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a) authorizes liens against homestead for six types of
transactions: (i) purchase money; (ii) ad valorem taxes; (iii) owelty partition;(iv) refinancing of a loan against the homestead; (v) a lien for construction of improve-
ments; and (vi) a credit extension.
3. Chase Manhatten Mortgage Corp., 141 S.W.3d at 714.
4. 121 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).
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tion for failure to submit evidence. Challenges were made as to proper
notice of default, notice of intent to accelerate, notice of sale, notice that
further late payments would not be accepted and the fact that notice
should have been sent to the wife of the grantor under the deed of trust.
The court of appeals first addressed the third party notice requirements.
The facts showed that Mrs. Stanley was not a party to the deed of the
property to Mr. Stanley or to the deed of trust in favor of the predecessor
to Citifinancial. The court concluded that no statutory provision requires
notice of a foreclosure be sent to persons not a party to the deed of trust,
but acknowledged that the deed of trust may contain such a requirement,
in which case notice to the designated party would be a requirement to a
valid foreclosure. 5 Because Mrs. Stanley did not file a copy of the deed of
trust, there was no evidence and summary judgment was upheld. Also,
Mrs. Stanley asserted equitable estoppel claiming that when the original
deed of trust lien was granted in favor of Ford Motor Company, repre-
sentatives of Ford Motor Company acknowledged that the company
knew of her interest in the property and promised she would be kept
apprised. The court, implying this defense could not be satisfied, looked
to the promissory estoppel exception to this rule, which allows such de-
fensive doctrine to be asserted to attack the enforceability of a promise
when the party relied upon such promise.6 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the promissory estoppel doctrine is available only for defen-
sive actions and cannot constitute a basis for affirmative relief, and
therefore dismissed the claim.
7
With respect to the other foreclosure prerequisites raised by the plain-
tiffs, the court upheld summary judgment due to lack of evidence. 8 With
respect to the notice of default, notice of intent to accelerate and notice
of sale, the debtors asserted that they did not receive any of the certified
mail sent by the defendant. The failure to receive the notice was not
proof of the facts applicable to these issues, which would be established
by proof of the lienholder's failure to comply with the applicable statu-
tory provision under the Texas Property Code and the deed of trust.
9 The
deed of trust was not submitted as evidence, and the statutory provisions
require only constructive notice and not actual notice.
10 A writing must
be sent by certified mail to each debtor to the last known address in the
records of the holder of the debt." Because the Stanleys offered no evi-
dence as to the address contained in the lienholder's records, there was
no evidence to support their allegations, thus giving rise to the summary
judgment motion against them. 12 The court further pointed out that un-
5. Id. at 817.
6. Id. at 820.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 817-18.






like the specific statutory requirements for a notice of sale under section
51.002(b)(3) of the Texas Property Code,13 the notice of default and no-
tice of intent to accelerate are not subject to any statutory requirements
or any existing case law. 14
Martin v. Cadle Co.1s involved a dispute over the priority of certainjudgment liens and the rights after foreclosure of a deed of trust lien.Various judgment liens against Jack Pratt, Jr. attached in May 1989, Janu-
ary 1992, October 1994, and December 1992 as junior liens to the subject
land, which was encumbered by vendor's and deed of trust liens held by
the predecessor-in-interest to Compass Bank. The vendor's lien created
by deed dated August 1, 1994 gave priority to the noteholder over the
prior recorded judgment liens. In 1997, Compass Bank executed a re-
lease of lien for the vendor's and deed of trust lien, reciting full payment
of the debt. Within two weeks of the recording of the release, a notice of
substitute trustee's sale was issued under the same vendor's lien. One
week after the foreclosure sale, Compass Bank executed a transfer of lien
stating "[t]his Transfer of Lien is given in lieu and substitution of the Re-
lease of Lien executed by Compass Bank."' 16 A few weeks after the sale,
the property was transferred to the Martins from the purchaser at the
sale. Various judgment creditors brought suits against the Martins claim-
ing that their judgment liens were superior to the foreclosed interest be-
cause the release of lien voided the vendor's lien.
The main issue concerned the effect of Compass Bank's release and
subsequent attempted correction of such release. The property owner ar-
gued that Compass Bank had the right to correct a mistake in the release
of lien; however, the court of appeals pointed out that the lienholder had
an equitable right to correction only in the event of a mutual mistake.' 7
The subject case contained no proof of any mutual mistake, and without
proof, the court refused to allow correction.' 8 The court distinguished
the plaintiff's authority, First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones,19 wherein
the release of lien released only a portion of the secured property even
though it stated the note was paid in full.2 0 This presented a discrepancy
on the face of the release itself.2 ' Furthermore, both the debtor and the
lienholder testified as to the mutual mistake of the "paid in full" lan-
guage. 22 These facts significantly distinguished the subject case from that
in Jones.23 The court characterized the plaintiff's action as not one of
correction but rather of rescission, which is an equitable remedy to extin-
13. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b)(3) (Vernon 1995).
14. Stanley, 121 S.W.3d at 818.
15. 133 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
16. Id. at 901.
17. Id. at 903.
18. Id.
19. 183 S.W. 874 (Tex. 1916).
20. Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 902-03.
21. Id. at 903.
22. Id. at 902-03.
23. Id.
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guish a legally valid contract, that can be set aside only due to fraud,
mistake or unjust enrichment.2 4 These elements were not proven, so re-
scission was not available.
25
The Martins then claimed that they obtained equitable title to the
property as bona fide purchasers. The court found that the Martins could
not be bona fide purchasers because they had inquiry notice of the re-
lease of lien in the chain of title of the property. 26 The chain of title for
this property shows a gap in the chain of title between the release of the
deed of trust lien and the transfer of lien, putting the Martins on inquiry
notice of the lack of validity of the transfer to the trustee.
27
II. NOTES, LOAN COMMITMENTS AND LOAN AGREEMENTS
Lender liability issues were presented in Citizens National Bank v. Al-
len Rae Investments, Inc. 28 Citizens National Bank (CNB) and a bank
officer defended claims, including a claim for fraud, brought by a bor-
rower, stemming from a loan that the borrower obtained to construct a
Bed & Bath Inn. Prior to the loan for the Bed & Bath Inn, plaintiffs
sought financing for a Motel 6 project. However, throughout the loan
approval process and the construction advance process, CNB and the
loan officer took several questionable actions or inactions including: per-
suading the borrower to invest in a Bed & Bath Inn instead of a Motel 6
without prior due diligence regarding Bed & Bath Inn; closing on the
loan to borrower, even though Bed & Bath Inn was not cooperating with
CNB's requests to review its financial information; hiring a construction
management firm with the borrower's funds to investigate Bed & Bath
Inn without the borrower's knowledge; failing to disclose any of the man-
agement firm's negative findings about Bed & Bath Inn to the borrower;
convincing the borrower to return the performance bond that they se-
cured for the project; continuing to release funds to Bed & Bath Inn de-
spite the management firm's warning not to advance additional funds;
and advancing funds even though lien releases were not secured. Eventu-
ally the borrower abandoned the construction project due to the mount-
ing number of mechanic's and materialman's liens that had attached to
the property due to Bed & Bath Inn's misappropriation of the construc-
tion funds. 29
CNB defended the claims of fraudulent nondisclosure by asserting that
the borrower had contractually waived and released its right to the with-
held information. After reviewing the agreements, the court of appeals
could not find a "specific, valid contractual release or waiver that in any
way absolved CNB of its duty to disclose" material information such as
24. Id. at 903.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 905.
27. Id.
28. 142 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
29. Id. at 468-73.
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Bed & Bath Inn's failure to provide adequate financial statements, CNB's
reluctance to direct any more customers to Bed & Bath Inn, the recom-
mendation of the management firm engaged by CNB not to advance
more funds, and the failure of Bed & Bath Inn to document how the
initial advance was spent.30 CNB was assessed actual and exemplary
damages for the fraud claims based on such non-disclosure. 31
Alma Group, L.L.C. v. Palmer,32 involved a suit on a note executed by
Palmer to Bank United. After the FDIC was appointed as receiver of the
original note and initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, Palmer
entered into a settlement agreement with the FDIC, which contained a
final judgment clause and a non-assignment clause. Palmer executed a
second note as part of the settlement agreement that contained neither
the non-assignment clause nor any reference to the settlement agree-
ment. After the FDIC transferred the second note and settlement agree-
ment to Beal, Palmer defaulted. As a result of the default, Beal
tranfsferred the note back to the FDIC. Almost a year later, the FDIC
transferred the second note and settlement agreement to Alma, who ac-
celerated the note.33
Palmer argues that the transfer to Alma was invalid because the non-
assignment language in the settlement agreement also applied to the sec-
ond note. The court of appeals found that the transfer was authorized
under the Financial Institutions Reforms, Recovery and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (FIRREA), which permits the FDIC to transfer assets without
consent or approval. 34 The court also found persuasive the fact that the
second note did not contain or reference the non-assignment provisions. 35
In re Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A. 36 was a case of first impression
involving a bank's motion for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge
to enforce the waiver of jury trial found in a note 37 and guaranty38 exe-
30. Id. at 476.
31. Id. at 491.
32. 143 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 845.
35. Id.
36. 115 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
37. The jury trial waiver in the note read as follows:
Maker hereby agrees not to elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of right byjury, and waives any right to trial by jury fully to the extent that any such
right shall now or hereafter exist with regard to this note, the mortgage [deed
of trust] and the other security documents, or any claim, counterclaim or
other action arising in connection therewith. This waiver of right to trial byjury is given knowingly and voluntarily by Maker, and is intended to encom-
pass individually each instance and each issue as to which the right to a trial
by jury would otherwise accrue. Payee is hereby authorized to file a copy of
this paragraph in any proceeding as conclusive evidence of this waiver by
Maker.
Id. at 603-04.
38. The jury trial waiver in the guaranty read as follows:
Guarantor hereby agrees not to elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of
right by jury, and waives any right to trial by jury fully to the extent that any
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cuted by the borrower and guarantor, respectively. Wells Fargo Bank
brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to order the court of
appeals to enforce the contractual jury waivers. The borrower and guar-
antor alleged that the Texas Constitution guarantees the right to a jury
trial in all civil cases. 39 The court reviewed case law from other states,
from federal courts and analogous Texas legal concepts in concluding that
contractual jury waivers are enforceable in Texas.40 The court noted that
a majority of states enforce jury waivers if the waiver is knowing, volun-
tary and intentional.41 Furthermore, the court pointed to the enforce-
ment of contractual jury waivers in federal court despite a right to a jury
trial contained in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.42 Even in Texas, parties can waive jury trials under numerous pro-
cedural circumstances: agreement for a bench trial, failure to timely pay a
jury fee, failure to timely request a jury trial, failure to appear for trial,
and failure to object to a bench trial. 43 In addition to such procedural
rules which effectively waive a jury trial, Texas courts have addressed
contractual arbitration agreements whereby jury trials, as well as more
inclusive rights, are waived.44 Enforceability of such arbitration agree-
ments have been clearly established in Texas. 45 Based on such persuasive
authority, the court declared contractual jury waivers to be enforceable in
Texas. 46
If the waivers, however, are not knowing and voluntary, they will not
be enforced.47 In considering the borrower's and guarantor's attack on
the knowing and voluntary nature of these waivers, the court first looked
to the clear language of the waiver provisions pointing out explicit lan-
guage that the waivers were "knowingly and voluntarily" made by the
borrower and guarantor.48 Further, the express language of the waivers
authorized the payee to file a copy of such a jury waiver paragraph in any
proceeding as conclusive evidence of waiver.49 Such clear language
shifted the burden of proof on the knowing and voluntary nature of the
such right shall now or hereafter exist with regard to this guaranty, the note,
the mortgage, or the other loan documents, or any claim, counterclaim or
other action arising in connection therewith. This waiver of right to trial by
jury is given knowingly and voluntarily by Guarantor, and is intended to en-
compass individually each instance and each issue as to which the right to a
trial by jury would otherwise accrue. Lender is hereby authorized to file a
copy of this paragraph in any proceeding as conclusive evidence of this
waiver by Guarantor.
Id. at 604.
39. TEX. CoNsT., art. I, § 15, art. V, § 10.
40. In re Wells Fargo Bank, 115 S.W.3d at 608-11.
41. Id. at 607 n.8.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 606-07.
44. Id. at 607.
45. Id. (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 607-08.
47. Id. at 609.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 610.
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waiver to the party challenging it.50 The first challenge was that there
was no meaningful negotiation because the note and guaranty were stan-
dard forms submitted on a "take it or leave it" basis. No evidence was
submitted on this claim; therefore, they failed to meet their burden of
proof.51 Secondly, the borrower and guarantor claimed that the waiver
was not knowing and voluntary because they could not know what claims
might accrue in the future. The court rejected this argument based upon
the arbitration analogy whereby the arbitration provisions are enforced
although the parties do not know every claim that might accrue in the
future. 52 Furthermore, the court pointed to the explicit waiver language
providing that the jury waiver covered "each instance and each issue as to
which the right to a trial by jury would otherwise accrue."'53 This was
deemed to encompass any conceivable future claims defeating such an
argument. 54 In dicta, the court also considered other possible defenses
that were not raised by the borrower and guarantor, although they were
established in the record. 55 These other factors included: (i) the party's
negotiations of the waiver provision; (ii) the conspicuousness of the pro-
vision; (iii) the relative bargaining positions; and (iv) whether the waiving
party asked counsel to review the provision.56 The court continued that
conspicuousness was satisfied because the waiver provision was bold-
faced, in all capital letters and set off in a separate paragraph.57 The
equality in bargaining power was satisfied because both parties were busi-
ness entities and the borrower/guarantor testified regarding his substan-
tial business enterprise. 58 The borrower/guarantor also testified that his
attorney reviewed the closing documents, thereby satisfying the indepen-
dent counsel review condition.59
Sibley v. RMA Partners, L.P./Sixth RMA Partners, L.P.60 involved is-
sues regarding attorneys' fees in a note collection case. Attorney's fees of
$82,748.50 were upheld, even though the notes were only in the aggregate
principal amount of $19,342.82 and had a principal and interest total of
only $43,000 at the time of trial. Both of the notes contained identical
language concerning collection costs, providing that upon default "the
maker will be required to pay the lender's reasonable costs and attorney's
fees incurred in enforcing its rights" and language concerning waiver,
providing that "the maker waives certain legal requirements relating to











60. 138 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
61. Id. at 457.
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claimed that proper presentment was not made, thereby defeating the
claim for attorneys' fees for the noteholder. The basis for this claim was
that the debt was owed to "Sixth RMA Partners, L.P.," but the demand
was made under the name of "RMA Partners," alleging a debt owed to
RMA Partners. For attorneys' fees to be awarded under the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, the claimant must present the claim to the
opposing party.62 Sibley contended that the claimant (Sixth RMA Part-
ners, L.P.) did not make demand, but rather it was RMA Partners, L.P.
Further, Sibley alleged that the failure of Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. to file
an assumed name as "RMA Partners, L.P." was additional evidence that
a presentment was not made by the claimant. However, the court of ap-
peals did not have to reach a decision on this point because it found that
the note's language provided a sufficient waiver of presentment such that
the trial court was entitled to award attorneys' fees pursuant to the prom-
issory note's terms rather than under the Texas Civil Practice & Reme-
dies Code.63
III. GUARANTIES
The only noteworthy case relating to guaranties during the Survey pe-
riod was In re Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A. 64 This case (discussed
above in connection with notes) confirmed that a proper contractual jury
waiver provision in a guaranty is enforceable against the guarantor.
65
IV. USURY
Third party expenses in a financing transaction are addressed in Lovick
v. Ritemoney, Ltd.,66 involving a class action claim against an automobile
title loan broker and lender. Although this was an automobile loan gov-
erned by a specific non-real estate related statute, it has some general
application to usury analysis of real estate cases. Betty Lovick requested
a $2,000 title loan, which was to originate from Ritemoney, Ltd. as lender
and CPCWA Company Ltd. as broker. Lovick agreed to pay a $1,500 fee
to the broker for "loan brokerage and other credit services" for the
loan.67 Lovick claimed that the $1,500 broker's fee was "disguised inter-
est" that, combined with the ten percent interest rate charged by the
lender, made the loan usurious by exceeding the ten percent authorized
by Texas law.68 The trial court dismissed Lovick's complaint for failure to
state a claim and Lovick appealed.
Lovick contended that the relationship between the broker and the
lender was sufficient to attribute the brokerage fee as interest to the
62. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 1997).
63. Sibley, 138 S.W.3d at 458.
64. In re Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A., 115 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th District] 2003, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
65. See supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
66. 378 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).
67. Id. at 436.
68. Id. at 437.
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lender. Lovick alleged that the broker performed tasks ordinarily per-
formed by a lender, including advertising, credit review, paperwork prep-
aration, and issuance and cashing of checks; these activities shifted the
lender's overhead to the broker. The court of appeals stated that broker
services are separate services for which the broker may charge a reasona-
ble fee; they do not constitute interest simply because those services
could have been part of the lender's overhead in non-brokered transac-
tions.69 Lovick also contended that the brokerage fee should be attrib-
uted to the lender because of the agency relationship between the lender
and the broker; all loans were brokered to the lender, and the lender
made all of its loans through the broker. However, Texas case law pro-
vides that the lender must benefit from the broker's fee in some way that
is not incidental in order to transform reasonable fees charged by the
broker into interest attributable to the lender.70 Lovick failed to demon-
strate any direct benefit to the lender, such as the flow of all or part of the
brokerage fee to the lender.71 Unlike normal real estate transactions, the
Credit Services Organizations Act (CSOA) 72 governs loan brokers and
permits a broker to charge a brokerage fee in connection with its services;
such fees are not interest. Essentially, CSOA expressly or impliedly per-
mits the activities allegedly engaged in by the broker. Nevertheless, for
general real estate financing transactions, the failure to prove a beneficial
interest in favor of the lender or to a general (as opposed to special)
agent should prevent fees paid to third party providers from being
deemed interest to the lender. 73
In Swank v. Sverdlin,74 agents and investors of a corporation appealed
a court's judgment of $180 million in favor of Anatoly Sverdlin, the for-
mer corporate CEO. Sverdlin, CEO of Automated Marine Propulsion
Systems, Inc. (AMPS), developed and secured patents for technology
that allegedly improved marine engine efficiency and lowered costs.
Sverdlin attracted investors who created L.D.E. Associates, L.L.C.
(LDE) to continue developing and marketing the technology. AMPS ob-
tained a two million dollar loan from LDE, and Sverdlin pledged stock
options in AMPS and assigned his patents-with an immediate, exclusive,
and royalty-free license to AMPS-to LDE to secure the loan. Sverdlin
alleged that the value of the assigned patents was interest that resulted in
usury. The trial court found that the patent rights and stock options were
compensation for the use of money and rendered judgment against LDE
for usury. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that a usurious
transaction is tested not by what the debtor parts with, but rather by what
69. Id. at 439.
70. Id. at 440.
71. Id. at 440-41.
72. TEX. FIN. CODE § 393.001-.505 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004-2005).
73. Lovick, 378 F.3d at 441.
74. 121 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
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the creditor receives. 75 Because LDE did not have the right to sell, use or
license such patents, LDE did not benefit from the full value of the
patents.76
V. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
In Mehan v. Wamco XXVVIII, Ltd.,77 Mehan sold a tract of real prop-
erty and the inventory and equipment on the property to Best, who ob-
tained financing from both Mehan (who retained a first priority security
interest in the real property and equipment and a second priority security
interest in the inventory) and a bank (who retained a first priority secur-
ity interest in the inventory and a second priority security interest in the
equipment). Wamco subsequently purchased the bank's security interest.
When Best defaulted on both loans, Mehan notified Wamco that it in-
tended to hold a foreclosure sale of the real property, inventory and
equipment; Wamco responded and claimed a superior lien on both the
equipment (which it later dropped after learning it did not have first pri-
ority in such equipment) and the inventory. Mehan subsequently fore-
closed on its interest in the equipment and inventory and purchased both
at the foreclosure sale, which extinguished Wamco's second priority se-
curity interest in the equipment. The court of appeals found that Wamco
did not have actual possession of the inventory and equipment, because
Wamco was not allowed on Mehan's property where the items were
stored and such property was locked and fenced.78 Wamco did not have
constructive possession of the property, because Wamco did not have the
ability to exercise control and dominion over the inventory without the
assistance of the court (because it could not do so without breaching the
peace).79 The court disagreed with Mehan's contentions that Wamco be-
came a trespasser on Mehan's property when it failed to remove the in-
ventory within a reasonable time. 80 Additionally, the court determined
that the trial court's judgment allowing Wamco to conduct a sale of the
inventory on Mehan's property was sufficient, even though it addressed
only entry rights, amount and timing of rental payments and deemed
abandonment for items left on the property, but failed to address insur-
ance, safety supervision, utility charges, and rights of lessees of the prop-
erty.81 The court concluded that there was no authority indicating that
the trial court must provide for all aspects of the sale to comply with the
applicable statute.82
75. Id. at 795 (quoting Stewart v. Briggs, 190 S.W. 221, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1916, no writ).
76. Id.
77. 138 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
78. Id. at 418.
79. Id. at 419.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 419-20.
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In Harding v. Lewis,83 Lewis sought an equitable exception to the dor-
mant judgment rules. Before Lewis' judgment against Harding became
dormant, Harding transferred six acres to his brother, who later trans-
ferred the acreage back to Harding. Harding did not record the deed
evidencing such transfer until after the statutory period of time to revive
a dormant judgment. Harding claimed his conduct did not prevent Lewis
from satisfying the judgment. However, Harding admitted that he knew
of the judgment-dormancy guidelines and that Harding's brother never
paid for the transferred property (in fact, Harding continued to pay for
it). Harding's brother testified that Harding wanted to hide such prop-
erty from the lawsuit and threatened his brother if he were to disclose the
concealment. The court of appeals determined that both direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Harding
performed a studied course in collection avoidance, which was sufficient
for revival of the dormant judgment. 84 Harding further argued a lack of
reasonable diligence on Lewis' part to discover assets. The record re-
vealed that while no "legal" discovery (meaning post judgment discovery
conducted through the judicial system) was conducted, the creditor, dur-
ing the ten year period of the abstract of judgment, researched the court-
house real property records for transactions involving the judgment
debtor and monitored the judgment debtor's mother's homestead and
obituaries. 85 A business asset search was also conducted.86 These consti-
tuted reasonable due diligence in the court's view. 87 Furthermore, the
court agreed with Lewis that the reasonable diligence duty applied to the
discovery of the fraud, not merely to the asset searches. 88 The court
noted that fraudulent behavior tolls limitations until the plaintiff discov-
ers or could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence. 89
Sterquell v. Scott was another fraudulent transfer case.90 Sterquell pre-
viously filed suit against Scott to recover the balance due on a note se-
cured by a lien on certain real estate and recovered a judgment, which he
filed an abstract of in the Potter County Clerk's office. Scott then filed
this suit, alleging that such an abstract of judgment created a lien on all
property owned by Scott in Potter County at that time and that Scott
transferred many properties to various trusts and entities in an attempt to
hide, transfer and conceal assets. The court of appeals set forth in detail
the various transfers that took place, the various trusts and other entities
involved in such transfers, and Scott's control or lack thereof over such
transfers, trusts and other entities. Scott claimed such transfers took
place as estate planning efforts by his mother. The court noted that a
83. 133 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
84. Id. at 696.
85. Id. at 696-97.
86. Id. at 697.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 697-98.
89. Id. at 697 (citing Estate of Stonecipher v. Estates of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809-10(Tex. 1992)).
90. 140 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.).
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fraudulent intent must be affirmatively shown, not presumed, and that,
while the evidence was sufficient to raise issues of fact, the court could
not say that the trial court's judgment in favor of the debtor was against
the great weight of the evidence.9 1 The court noted, for example, that
there was no evidence, with respect to a limited partnership that pur-
chased and foreclosed on one of the liens involved, that Scott had any
part in the creation of the limited partnership, nor that he transferred any
property to that entity.92 Other transfers support the trial court's judg-
ment, as the trial court could have (i) placed emphasis on the lack of
evidence in connection with whether the properties transferred consti-
tuted all or a substantial part of the property owned or that might have
been owned by Scott, (ii) accepted the testimony that the various entities
were created for legitimate estate planning purposes (and in most in-
stances were not created by Scott), and (iii) placed some credence on the
fact that the transfers involved were not hidden, but were instead matters
of public record.93
Although the next case deals with fraud in a deposit account context, it
could be applicable to real estate financing transactions that are tax moti-
vated. Lewis v. Bank of America NA 94 involved a petition for rehearing.
Previously, Lewis sued the bank and a loan officer alleging fraud and
breach of contract when the parties failed to place funds in tax-deferred
certificates of deposit. The action was removed, and a jury found for the
borrower and the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas denied the defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law and entered judgment for the borrower. The parties cross-ap-
pealed and the court of appeals reversed.95 On borrower's petition for
rehearing, Lewis argued that the bank's loan officer had a duty to disclose
the taxability of the new account according to Union Pacific Resources
Group, Inc. v. Rhone.96 Rhone held that a duty to speak arises by opera-
tion of law when one party voluntarily discloses some but less than all
material facts, so that he must disclose the whole truth (i.e., all material
facts), lest his partial disclosure convey a false impression.97 The court
agreed that Rhone correctly stated current Texas law but determined that
even if the loan officer knew of such tax consequences and had an obliga-
tion to advise Lewis accordingly, Lewis still had not satisfied the require-
ment that he was justified in relying on the loan officer for tax advice. 98
Reliant Energy Services v. Enron Canada Corp.99 involved a Master
Netting, Setoff and Security Agreement ("Netting Agreement") between
several Reliant-affiliated entities ("Reliant Parties") and five subsidiaries
91. Id. at 460-61.
92. Id. at 461.
93. Id.
94. 347 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2003).
95. Lewis v. Bank of Am. NA, 343 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2003).
96. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Rhone, 247 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2001).
97. Id. at 574.
98. Lewis, 343 F.3d at 547.
99. 349 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 2003).
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of the Enron Corporation (collectively, "Enron Parties"). The Reliant
Parties and Enron Parties previously entered into various master sales
agreements regarding the trade and sale of natural gas, electricity and
broadband data capacity (with each such agreement being entered into
between a single Enron party and a single Reliant party). When ques-
tions arose regarding Enron Corporation's accounting practices and fi-
nancial statements, the Enron Parties and Reliant Parties entered into the
Netting Agreement, which combined all underlying master agreements
into one single integrated agreement. The Netting Agreement provided
that if one of the parties defaulted, the non-defaulting party could declare
all of the underlying master agreements in default (or "cross-default"),
upon which the non-defaulting party could accelerate the transactions
and exercise certain setoff rights, among other things. Upon such a close
out of the transactions, a "Settlement Amount" would be determined,
which would be the net amount due and payable by one party to the
other. The Netting Agreement further provided for a netting or offset-
ting of the settlement amounts from each underlying master agreement,
so the parties could arrive at a final settlement amount. The procedures
set forth stated in pertinent part that "[t]he Final Settlement Amount
shall be payable by the Group from whom such payment is due on the
third Business Day after the statement is provided." 1°°
Reliant notified the Enron Parties of one of the Enron Parties' default
of an underlying master agreement on November 30, 2001. On Decem-
ber 2, 2001, the Enron Parties, except for Enron Canada (one of the En-
ron subsidiaries who was a party to the Netting Agreement), filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, after which such Enron Parties were
protected from suit by reason of the automatic stay. After netting the
settlement amount as required under the Netting Agreement, Reliant
sought the settlement amount ($78,468,996.60) from Enron Canada, argu-
ing that the terms of the Netting Agreement made Enron Canada jointly
liable for such damages. Enron Canada responded that it was not subject
to the court's personal jurisdiction, that Reliant violated the bankruptcy
stay, and that Enron Canada was not liable for the debts of its affiliates
under the Netting Agreement.
The court of appeals noted that, as a general rule, an obligation entered
into by more than one person is presumed to be joint, but this presump-
tion can be overcome by express words of severance, an indication of an
intention to be bound severally, or a statute declaring such contract sev-
eral. 101 Without such an applicable statute, the court analyzed whether
the language of the Netting Agreement imposed several or joint obliga-
tions, either expressly or though an indicated intention.10 2 After careful
analysis of the language noted above with respect to payment of the set-
tlement amount, the court determined that the language was ambiguous,
100. Id. at 820.




as two different meanings of the language were plausible. The court re-
manded the case to the district court to make a factual determination as
to the intentions of the parties. 10 3 This case is instructive to practitioners
who sometimes carelessly use the phrase "as applicable" to simplify draft-
ing but which leaves the contract ambiguous. 104
The court then analyzed whether the case constituted the type of unu-
sual circumstance that should extend a bankruptcy stay.105 The court
noted that an automatic stay usually applies only to the debtor, and not
co-debtors, but that an exception may be invoked where "there is such
identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor
may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against
the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against
the debtor. 10 6 The court determined that the district court's finding that
this exception extended to Enron Canada was premised largely on the
district court's finding that Enron Canada was not obligated under the
contract for the debts of the other Enron Parties. 10 7 Therefore, the court
remanded the case to the district court to reconsider this issue in light of
its findings as to the meaning of the Netting Agreement.1 08 Circuit Judge
Carl E. Stewart dissented, stating that the terms of the Netting Agree-
ment were not ambiguous, and Enron Canada should not be obligated to
pay the debts of any other Enron party. 10 9
VI. PURCHASER/SELLER
McMillan v. Dooley ° involved the enforcement of rights of first re-
fusal. The three plaintiffs were original lessees of three different leases;
the plaintiffs entered into farmout agreements specifying that the lessee
would assign its interest in the applicable lease if successful drilling oc-
curred. The farmout agreements further reserved for each lessee a pref-
103. Id. at 824-25.
104. The ambiguous provision from the Netting Agreement regarding the express cove-
nant of payment of the Final Settlement Amount provides, in relevant part, that the Final
Settlement Amount shall be payable by "the Group from whom such payment is due." Id.
at 823. The Netting Agreement defined "Group" as the Enron Group or Counter Party
Group, as applicable, and defined "Enron Group" to mean all Enron Parties (which would
include Enron Canada). If the term "all Enron Parties" is substituted for the word
"Group," the provision reads that the Final Settlement Amount is payable by all Enron
Parties from whom such payment is due. This interpretation would make the obligations
of the Enron Parties several as to their own indebtedness. The other possible interpreta-
tion of this language is that the phrase "applicable" relates to the word "Group." Under
this interpretation, the applicable phrase reads that either the Enron Group or the Counter
Party Group, as applicable, would make the payment of the Final Settlement Amount.
Such interpretation would render all Enron Parties jointly liable for the Final Settlement
Amount. The remainder of the Netting Agreement was not sufficiently clear to be able to
determine which of these interpretations was intended by the parties.
105. Id. at 825.
106. Id. (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986)).
107. Id. at 825-26.
108. Id. at 826.
109. Id. at 826-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110. 144 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied).
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erential right to purchase the lease in the event the assignee later sold the
lease. They also provided that the assignee must notify such lessee prior
to its subsequent sale of the lease and the lessee would have ten days to
purchase for the price offered (after which the assignee was free to sell).
The leases were each assigned by the lessees under the respective farmout
agreements to third parties who were affiliated with one another, and
such assignees then subsequently assigned all three leases to one party in
a package conveyance, without notice being given to any of the preferen-
tial purchase rightholders. 1
When Dooley (one of the preferential purchase right holders) in-
formed the subsequent assignees of his preferential purchase right, the
subsequent assignees offered to sell Dooley the package of leases for the
same price that they had paid. Dooley declined the offer (as he was only
interested in purchasing the Dooley lease portion of the package).
Dooley demanded information pertaining to the terms of the conveyance
but was told there was no way to divide the properties. Dooley eventu-
ally filed suit against the assignees under the farmout agreements, and the
subsequent assignees and Smith and Johnson (the preferential purchase
right holders in the other two leases) joined as plaintiffs. 112
The court of appeals found that the assignee's previous breaches of the
preferential purchaser rights under the farmout agreement (upon various
conveyances of fractional interests) did not bar the suit because the suit
was brought within the limitations period of this particular conveyance.
The court further found that the plaintiffs had not waived their claims
based on earlier breaches, as such earlier breaches were for fractional
interests and did not evidence waiver in the event of a conveyance of all
interests. 113 The court stated that when a sale is made in breach of a
preferential purchase right, the rightholder obtains an enforceable option
to acquire the property according to the terms of the conveyance, but that
such an option is not perpetual and must either be accepted or rejected
within the specified time frame, as if notice had been properly given.114
The court discussed whether the provision in this case was a "price"
agreement (where the provision specifies the price at which the right may
be exercised) or a "terms and conditions" agreement (where the property
owner can strike its best deal and require the rightholder to match that
bargain) and determined that, although the provision used the term
"price," the provision otherwise did not contain any limitations on the
bargain the original assignee could negotiate with a subsequent potential
purchaser. 115
The court further determined that the inclusion of the other leases in
the offer presented to Dooley did not violate the express terms of the
111. Id. at 164-66.
112. Id. at 166-69.
113. Id. at 170-71.
114. Id. at 172.
115. Id. at 174-75.
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preferential purchase provision with respect to the terms of conveyance
to which the assignee and purchasers could have agreed, and that the
offer given to Dooley was therefore not invalid.116 The court held that
the defendants made a sufficient presentment of the preferential right if
they made a reasonable disclosure to Dooley of the terms of the contem-
plated conveyance, regardless of whether the offer included property not
covered by the preferential purchase right. 117 The court noted that exer-
cising an option is equivalent to accepting an offer, and the general rule is
that to accept an offer, one cannot change or qualify its terms. 11 8 How-
ever, the court determined that since "a rightholder is not permitted to
expand its preferential purchase right to include property not covered by
the provision, it would be improper for him to be required to accept other
property not covered by his preferential purchase right." 11 9 Although
Dooley was not required to accept the other leases in order to exercise
his preferential purchase right, Dooley did not thereafter continue to pos-
sess the opportunity to exercise the right with respect to the Dooley lease
portion indefinitely. 120 Dooley's rejection of the "package" offer thus
prevented him from subsequently attempting to exercise the preferential
purchase right as to the specific property.121 Dooley was required to take
affirmative steps within the time period specified to preserve the viability
of his option, such as notifying the property owner that he intended to
exercise his preferential purchase right subject to his objection to the dis-
puted terms, filing a declaratory judgment action prior to the date re-
quired for acceptance with regard to the disputed terms, or demanding
that the right of first refusal be honored and depositing earnest money as
tender of intended performance. 122
With regard to Smith's claims, the court determined that although the
subsequent purchasers were not parties to the original agreement, they
expressly assumed responsibility for complying with its obligations, and
their abandonment of the lease triggered their obligation to provide
Smith with an opportunity to purchase the lease (independently of the
original assignor's obligation to provide Smith notice when such original
assignor conveyed the lease). 123 With regard to Johnson's claims, the
court determined that, despite various conveyances made by Johnson
with respect to the lease, Johnson reserved the preferential purchase right
in his capacity as the lessee of the lease, and the other conveyances did
not include the conveyance of such interest.1 24 The preferential purchase
right is a covenant running with the land, and, therefore, the purchaser
was bound by the preferential purchase right provision upon obtaining
116. Id. at 173-75.
117. Id. at 174-76.
118. Id. at 178-79.
119. Id. at 179.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 180.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 182.
124. Id. at 184.
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the lease; however, Johnson was not required to own a real property in-
terest in order to enforce the right he still had, as that would be contrary
to the intentions of the parties as evidenced in the documents.
125
Lastly, the court determined that the subsequent purchasers were not
trespassers on the Dooley lease land, as Dooley did not possess a prop-
erty interest in such land that could be subject to trespass (because his
right terminated). 126 Additionally, Johnson did not have a sufficient in-
terest in his applicable property to claim trespass, as the gist of an action
of trespass to realty is the injury to the right of possession. Johnson did
not have such a right of possession prior to obtaining relief from the trial
court.
1 2 7
In Cendant Mobility Services Corp. v. Falconer,128 Falconer, through
Cendant, purchased a house with serious latent structural flaws. Falconer
sued, asserting fraud and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Falconer claimed that
Cendant failed to disclose that the house's foundation showed evidence
of substantial movement and that Cendant provided only a portion of the
relevant engineer's report for his review. The court of appeals noted,
however, that Cendant initialed each page of an engineering report that
disclosed such information about the foundation. 129 The court disagreed
with Falconer's contention that he was misled by Cendant's agent because
the agent orally explained only portions of the report to him, and held
that there was no duty under the DTPA requiring sellers to orally disclose
the contents of a written contract. 130 The court noted that it is well set-
tled that parties to a contract have an obligation to read what they sign
and that the exception to this rule only applies in cases of false represen-
tations that induce another party to contract.' 3 ' The court found no evi-
dence of fraud, as the applicable information was disclosed in written
form and the information given orally did not contradict such written in-
formation. 132 The court held that there was no evidence showing
Cendant failed to disclose any information in an attempt to fraudulently
induce Falconer to contract, but that Cendant did disclose all material
matters.133
In Lyman D. Robinson Family Ltd. v. McWilliams & Thompson, 34 the
appellee (acting as escrow agent) mistakenly released to the appellant
escrowed amounts that pertained to two different transactions instead of
125. Id. at 185.
126. Id. at 188.
127. Id. (citing Pentagon Enter. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 540 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
128. 135 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
129. Id. at 352.
130. Id. at 354.
131. Id. (citing First City Mortgage Co. v. Gillis, 694 S.W.2d 144, 146-47 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 143 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
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the one requested amount that applied to the transaction at hand. Appel-
lee requested that the overpayment be repaid, and appellant refused.
The court of appeals noted that it is a general rule that money paid under
a mistake of fact may be recovered and that negligence in paying does not
give the payee the right to keep what was not his, unless he was misled or
prejudiced by the mistake. 135 The court determined that the fact that ap-
pellant paid taxes on such extra amount of money and made other ex-
penditures in reliance on the payment did not prejudice appellant, as
appellant's receiving money to which it was not entitled, or claiming, pay-
ing taxes on and spending such money, did not "prejudice" appellant. 136
Additionally, the court determined that appellant's argument with regard
to such being a unilateral mistake did not apply, as such argument in-
volved case law applicable to money paid voluntarily with full knowledge
of all facts, as opposed to the case at hand where money was paid by
mistake. 37
In Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso,138 the Texas Su-
preme Court analyzed whether a county waived its immunity from suit by
soliciting bids for purchasing a parcel of land, accepting the highest bid,
depositing the tendered earnest money, and sending the purported buyer
a warranty deed and affidavit to close the transaction. When the county
delayed authorization to sign the deed and a newly elected commission-
ers court refused to approve the sale, the buyer sued. The supreme court
held that the county, by its conduct, did not waive its immunity from
suit. 139 When a governmental unit contracts with a private party, it
waives immunity from liability but not immunity from suit (which it can
do only through express consent). 140 The supreme court found that the
actions of the county are the kind that are necessary and expected during
contract formation, and noted that the supreme court had previously
made clear that contract formation, by itself, is not sufficient to waive a
governmental unit's immunity from suit.14' Such a waiver may be recog-
nized by conduct in some situations, but the supreme court found that the
equitable basis for such a waiver did not exist on the facts.' 42 The su-
preme court further noted that the bidding statutes under which the sale
of the land was conducted support this conclusion and that a governmen-
tal entity acting under the statutes is not required to accept any bid or
complete a sale.' 43 Justice Enoch dissented, noting that the supreme
135. Id. at 520 (citing Hall v. Freedman, 383 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 521.
138. 121 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2003).
139. Id. at 707.
140. Id. at 705 (citing Travis County v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex.
2002)).
141. Id. at 706.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 707.
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court's position is unique among most states. 144
In Oat Note, Inc. v. Ampro Equities, Inc. 145 Oat Note sold a piece of
land to M&L England under a contract which required M&L England to
improve an existing low-water crossing on the property per city regula-
tions. The contract also required Oat Note to construct a road leading
from the highway to such low-water crossing on the adjacent land it re-
tained within six months of completion of the law-water crossing. Oat
Note subsequently sold the adjacent land to Ampro, who assumed the
obligation to build the road. Although the President of Oat Note was
informed that the low-water crossing was complete, he did not inform
Ampro of such fact. When M&L England sued those involved, Ampro
entered into a settlement with M&L England, and then filed a cross-claim
against Oat Note claiming fraud and misrepresentation regarding the
construction obligations. The court of appeals found that the fact that the
property was conveyed "as-is" was not determinative because Ampro's
damages were not a result of factors that fell under the agreement, but
instead were caused by the misrepresentation made as to whether M&L
England believed the low-water crossing was complete. 146 The court
found that evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Oat
Note's misrepresentations with regard to whether the low-water crossing
was complete caused Ampro's damages. 147 The court further held that
damages were proper in this case because the damages involved stemmed
from an injury independent of the relative benefit of the bargain itself.1 48
In Dickey v. McComb Development Co., Inc. ,149 the Dickeys entered
into a deed contract with McComb, subsequently made improvements to
the property, moved onto the property, moved off the property, and
eventually leased it to a third party. After eight years of making pay-
ments to McComb, the Dickeys received notice that they were delinquent
in two payments and failed to pay certain property taxes and that they
had thirty days to correct such defaults, or the contract would be termi-
nated. The Dickeys tendered payment one day after the deadline and,
although McComb physically took the payment, McComb notified the
Dickeys that the payment was too late and terminated the contract. The
Dickeys sued, claiming that McComb wrongfully terminated the parties'
contract for the sale of land, failed to provide proper notice of a default in
payment for the land, and failed to give the Dickeys a sufficient opportu-
nity to cure the default. The court of appeals found that the Dickeys
were not entitled to a sixty-day cure period, as is required in connection
with certain residential properties under the Texas Property Code, be-
cause the property was not being used as a residence. Nor did the evi-
144. Id. (Enoch, J., dissenting).
145. 141 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
146. Id. at 279.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 280.
149. 115 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
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dence prove the Dickeys' intent to reside on the property in the future. 150
The fact that McComb physically took the payment did not amount to a
waiver or acceptance, as the Dickeys were informed at the time of at-
tempted payment that the payment was too late. McComb did not in any
other manner accept the payment as timely or curative. 15 1 Justice Stone
concurred with the opinion and noted that the case displays the inherent
unfairness that can arise when a contract for deed is used to obtain real
property. 152
In Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co.,153 property owners sued defendants
for contamination and injuries to their land caused by the presence of oil
and gas equipment. The court of appeals noted that a cause of action
accrues when a plaintiff first becomes entitled to file a lawsuit based on a
legal wrong and that the right to sue is a personal right belonging to the
person owning the property at the time of the injury. 154 Without an ex-
press provision stating otherwise, such right does not pass to a subsequent
purchaser of the property.' 55 The facts of the case showed that Citgo sold
the pipeline before the Denmans purchased the property and that, since
the sale, Citgo had not conducted operations on the Denman property 56
Evidence that Citgo had a second pipeline on the property was insuffi-
cient, and the fact that Citgo's signs had not been removed or replaced
was not determinative as to whether Citgo owned a second pipeline or
was continuing to operate on the property. 157 The court determined that
the Denmans lacked standing to sue because any injury to their property
occurred before they purchased it and their deed contained no assign-
ment of any cause of action. 158 Whether the injury was temporary or
permanent is meaningless with respect to the issue of standing, so long as
the injury occurred prior to the plaintiff's purchase of the land. 59
In Roundville Partners, L.L.C. v. Jones,'60 Roundville sued Jones seek-
ing specific performance of a commercial earnest money contract. The
court of appeals noted that to assert a right under an escrow contract, a
party must show that it complied with the conditions of escrow, in that it
actually tendered performance or that it offered to perform and was pre-
vented from performing through no fault of its own.161 It was undisputed
that Roundville did not actually tender performance on the contract
within the time specified, as Roundville had not executed the required
documentation, among other things. The court found that Jones' inaction
150. Id. at 45.
151. Id. at 46.
152. Id. at 47 (Stone, J., concurring).
153. 123 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
154. Id. at 732 (citing Zidell v. Bird, 692 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no
writ)).
155. ld.
156. Id. at 733.
157. Id. at 734.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 735.
160. 118 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
161. Id. at 79 (citing Bell v. Rudd, 191 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1946)).
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with respect to closing the transaction did not rise to the level of affirma-
tively preventing Roundville from tendering his performance.
162
Roundville previously executed documents and a lien note with respect
to a previous transaction with Jones, in spite of Jones' similar failures, and
there was no evidence that Roundville could not have done the same in
this situation.163 Because Roundville did not tender performance and
failed to establish that he was prevented from tendering performance,
Roundville was not entitled to the remedy of specific performance.
64
In Garrod Investments, Inc. v. Schlegel,165 Schlegel used a standard
form contract to make a written and signed offer to sell a condominium
to Garrod. Garrod altered the financing terms and closing date of the
offer, signed it, and returned it to Schlegel. The court of appeals noted
that any material change in a proposed contract constitutes a counterof-
fer, which must be accepted by the other party for a contract to exist.'
66
The court determined that Garrod's changes to the contract were made to
material terms to the contract, and therefore constituted a counterof-
fer. 167 The Schlegels' evidence showed that they never signed the con-
tract after such changes were made by Garrod; therefore, the court held
that the contract did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and could not be
enforced. 168
In Overton v. Bengel,169 Overton signed a "First Right of Refusal" with
a representative of the trust that held title to the property in question.
The "First Right of Refusal" gave Overton thirty days to purchase two
tracts of land at a set price after receiving notice of the death of the survi-
vor of certain parties to the trust. After such death, the executor signed a
contract to sell the applicable land to Cherokee. When Overton tried to
enforce his "First Right of Refusal," Cherokee refused to release the es-
tate from its contract. The court found that, despite the title of the docu-
ment, the agreement was in fact an option to purchase the property, as it
gave Overton a right to purchase such property for a fixed price within a
set time period. 170 The court further found that because a sales contract
that was to be attached to the option contract was not attached, and be-
cause the sales contract the Overtons cited as the correct one was not
signed by the party to be charged, the contract was unenforceable be-
cause it did not comply with the Statute of Frauds.' 71 When agreements
are defined within a memorandum, the memorandum must contain all
the essential elements of the agreement, so that such agreement can be
162. Id. at 81.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 139 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).
166. Id. at 764-65 (internal citations omitted).
167. Id. at 764.
168. Id. at 765.
169. 139 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
170. Id. at 757.
171. Id. at 758.
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understood from the writings without resorting to oral testimony. 172 If
one document refers to another, such reference must contain sufficient
details of the separate contract and merely alluding to such contract is
insufficient. 1
73
In In re Fitzmaurice,74 the court of appeals analyzed whether an ade-
quate nexus existed between a party's claims and the property that was
subject to a lis pendens. A party may file a lis pendens to give construc-
tive notice to those taking title to property that the property is subject to
a claim.175 In this case, purchasers of property in a residential subdivision
sued the developers, alleging that the developers made representations
regarding the construction of certain amenities in the subdivision, and the
purchasers filed a lis pendens against 700 acres of land. The defendants
argued that the suit did not involve a dispute over the ownership of the
property described in the lis pendens and that the lis pendens should
therefore be canceled. Plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust
over the remaining property owned by the developer to prevent unjust
enrichments. The plaintiffs also sought to have the properties delivered
to them so that they could operate such properties for the benefit of the
homeowners as was represented by the defendants. The court held that
the pleading of the parties did not identify any specific property where
the alleged amenities were to be built, but instead applied the lis pendens
to all unsold lots plus adjacent property outside the subdivision. 176 The
court found that no adequate nexus existed between the claims and the
property, and, therefore, the motion to cancel the lis pendens was
granted.177
VII. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
There were a few notable cases decided during the Survey period in-
volving real property and claims of violations under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA").
In the Citizens National Bank178 case, one issue before the court of
appeals was whether the size of ARI's construction loan with the bank
exceeded the threshold requirement for bringing a claim under the
DTPA. The DTPA does not apply to "a cause of action arising from a
transaction, a project, or a set of transactions relating to the same project,
involving total consideration by the consumer of more than $500,000,
other than a cause of action involving a consumer's residence. ' 179 Citi-
172. Id. (citing Cohen v. McCutchin, 575 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1978)).
173. Id. (citing EP Operating Co. v. MJC Energy Co., 883 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied)).
174. 141 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
175. Id. at 803 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007 (Vernon 2004)).
176. Id. at 805.
177. Id.
178. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.).
179. Id. at 473 (citing TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(g) (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
109920051
SMU LAW REVIEW
zens National Bank ("CNB") made a construction loan to ARI in the
principal amount of $600,000. CNB contends that the consideration was
in excess of $500,000, so the DTPA does not apply. ARI, on the other
hand, contends that since only $463,193.45 was advanced to ARI, the
DTPA applies. The court recognized that the issue of whether the term
"consideration" as used in the statute involves only detriment actually
incurred or detriment that a consumer promises to incur in the future was
an issue of first impression in Texas. 180 However, the court determined
that it did not need to decide that issue.' 81 The court noted that ARI
paid $122,096.81 to CNB at closing ($90,000 of which was for purchasing
the lot on which the hotel would be built, and the other amount was pre-
sumably for closing costs of the loan), and that amount, even if just added
to the $463,193.45 amount, would cause the total consideration to exceed
$500,000.182 Therefore, the court held that the DTPA did not apply and
held that the trial court abused its discretion in submitting the DTPA jury
question and allowing ARI to recover from CNB under the DTPA.183
The question as to whether "consideration" under the DTPA would only
involve an amount of a loan actually advanced or the entire amount of
the note was not decided by the court.1 84
The Barnett v. Coppell North Texas Court, Ltd.' 85 case involved false
representations made by a construction contractor. CNTC hired Barnett
to construct an athletic facility, and the parties entered into a construc-
tion contract. Barnett ceased construction before the project was fin-
ished, the bank foreclosed, and this lawsuit followed; CNTC brought
claims against Barnett for violations of the DTPA. The trial court found
for CNTC. Barnett appealed on various issues, including that the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish CNTC's DTPA claim.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the
evidence supporting the jury's finding was not so weak as to be clearly
unjust and wrong.' 8 6 Barnett's representations, on which the trial court
entered judgment for CNTC, included the following: (i) he promised to
build "three times the facility for one and a half times the amount of
money;" (ii) he stated that the contractual amount of $1.96 million was
"more than adequate to build this project;" (iii) he "guaranteed" he
would finish the project "no matter what" for $180,000, regardless of
whether costs increased; (iv) he represented that the building would be
completed in six months and that he would have "time to spare;" (v) he
said the quality of construction would be "great"; and (vi) he indicated
that he had adequate crews of approximately twenty or more men to
180. Id.




185. 123 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
186. Id. at 822.
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"knock it out real quick."'1 8 7 In his appeal, Barnett claimed that construc-
tion contracts are exempt from DTPA, but because this was not raised in
the trial court, he waived his right to raise it on appeal.' 88
VIII. LEASES
Several cases were decided during the Survey period relating to land-
lord and tenant disputes. In particular, issues presented this year with
respect to commercial leases included the implied warranty of suitability
for commercial purposes and title to improvements constructed on the
leased premises.
Lee v. Perez'89 involved the implied warranty of suitability for commer-
cial purposes. Perez entered into a commercial lease with Lee for the
lease of two lots in Houston. The lease specifically provided that the lots
could be used only for the sale, financing and insurance of automobiles.
Perez received a letter from an attorney with the City of Houston inform-
ing him that he was in violation of a deed restriction limiting the property
to residential use. Perez ceased operating his business on the lots and
sued Lee, his landlord. The trial court held that Lee breached the lease
and awarded actual damages to Perez. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision. The court held that the deed restriction rendered
the lots unsuitable for the purpose required under the lease. 190
The court cited authority for the proposition that there is an implied
warranty under Texas law that a commercial lease is suitable for the in-
tended commercial purpose.191 This implied warranty of suitability for
commercial purposes only applies to latent defects. 192 Lee argued that
the deed restriction was not a latent defect because it was filed against the
premises in the real property records of the county. Because the docu-
ment was recorded, Lee contended that Perez had constructive notice of
the restriction. The court rejected Lee's argument, holding that the doc-
trine of constructive notice applies to buyers of real property and there-
fore declining to extend its application to tenants.1 93
Lee also argued that the implied warranty did not apply because the
lease contained an "as-is" clause by which Perez accepted the leased
premises. The court held that the "as is" clause only related to the physi-
cal condition of the property and did not contain a waiver of any express
or implied warranties of suitability.1 94 The "as is" clause provided that
"Tenant has examined and accepts the leased premises in its present as is
condition as suitable for the purposes for which the same are leased, and
187. Id. at 822-23.
188. Id. at 822.
189. 120 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
190. Id. at 466.




194. Id. at 467-68.
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does hereby accept the leased premises."'1 95 If the "as-is" language had
included an express disclaimer and waiver by Perez of any warranty, ex-
press or implied, for the suitability or fitness of the leased premises for a
particular purpose, the court implied that it probably would have reached
a different conclusion. 196
Travis Central Appraisal District v. Signature Flight Support Corp.197
also involved a commercial lease. Here, the issue was whether the tenant
or the landlord owned improvements on leased property when the tenant
constructed such improvements. The tenant entered into a lease with the
City of Austin for property at the Austin-Bergstrom International Air-
port. The lease required the tenant to construct certain airport facilities.
The Travis Central Appraisal District ("TCAD") assessed property taxes
against the tenant, asserting that the tenant owned or had a taxable own-
ership interest in the improvements. Tenant then initiated a suit seeking
declaratory judgment that the property taxes assessed against the tenant
were invalid, arguing that the improvements are owned by the City for a
public use and thus are tax exempt.
In Texas, the general rule is that improvements become part of the land
on which they are constructed and belong to the landowner unless the
parties agree otherwise. 198 The court of appeals reviewed the language in
the lease and concluded that the parties intended that the improvements
would be owned by the city. 199 The language in the lease provided: "Le-
gal title to Facilities constructed by Tenant shall be held by the City after
acceptance of the Facilities by the City and shall be completely vested in
the city at the end of the term of this Agreement. '' 2°° The evidence at
trial indicated that the city accepted the improvements in 2000, and thus,
the court held that the city held title to the improvements since 2000.201
TCAD pointed to several other provisions in the lease, arguing that
they were contrary to a finding that the parties intended that the city
owned the improvements. Among the provisions TCAD addressed was a
provision in the lease that allowed the tenant to "sell the Facilities. '20 2
The court interpreted this provision as granting the tenant the right to sell
its ownership interest in the leasehold, but not a right to sell the
improvements. 203
The issue before the Texas Supreme Court in Universal Health Services
v. Renaissance Women's Group, P.A. 20 4 was whether the landlord had a
covenant to continue operating a hospital located in the same building as
the leased premises. The tenants were physicians who entered into an
195. Id. at 468.
196. Id.
197. 140 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
198. Id. at 838 (citing Lindsley v. Lewis, 84 S.W.2d 994, 995-96 (Tex. 1935)).
199. Id. at 840.
200. Id. at 839.
201. Id. at 843.
202. Id. at 841.
203. Id.
204. 121 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003).
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agreement with the owner of a hospital to lease office space in the same
building as the hospital. The owner contacted the physicians to promote
the owner's women's health center concept. During the second year of
the ten-year lease, the owner decided to close the hospital. The physi-
cians sued for damages and sought injunctive relief to keep the hospital
open, alleging that the owner was bound by the lease to keep the hospital
open throughout the term of the lease. The trial court ruled in favor of
the physicians, and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The Texas Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that nothing in the lease required the hos-
pital to stay open.20 5
The physicians relied on language in the lease (and in related letter
agreements) that provided that the project "will be composed of a wo-
men's hospital located on the first floor. '20 6 The supreme court held that
this language was merely a general description of the project and did not
constitute an obligation on the part of the owner to continue operation of
the hospital.20 7 The physicians also relied on language that required the
owner to "use diligent efforts to obtain all licenses and permits required
... to operate the women's hospital" and to "use reasonable efforts to
obtain, and maintain in full force and effect throughout the Term of the
Lease, written agreements.., certifying the Project as an approved hos-
pital by ... health insurance companies... for which [the physicians]...
are approved providers. '20 8 The supreme court also held that these pro-
visions did not expressly impose an obligation on the owner to operate
the hospital.20 9
The supreme court analogized these facts to a "permitted use clause" in
a lease. If a lease states, for example, that the premises will be used for
the sale of clothing and for no other purpose, that provision does not
impart an obligation on the tenant to use or continue to use the premises
for that purpose.2 10 The court did not decide whether the lease or letter
agreements in this case implied an obligation on the owner to operate the
hospital for the lease term because the physicians failed to plead that
claim and waived any right to an implied covenant of continuous
operation. 211
Several issues were before the Texarkana Court of Appeals in the Flag-
ship Hotel case, 2 12 but the most noteworthy issue regarding landlord and
tenant matters was whether an amendment created a new lease for pur-
poses of section 307.023 of the Texas Government Code. The predeces-
sor-in-interest of Flagship Hotel, Ltd. entered into a lease agreement with
205. Id. at 748.
206. Id. at 746.
207. Id. at 746-47.
208. Id. at 746.
209. Id. at 747.
210. Id. (citing Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd)).
211. Id. at 748.




the City of Galveston, pursuant to which the city agreed to construct a
hotel on a pier, in return for the hotel leasing the pier and operating the
hotel. Section 307.023 of the Texas Government Code provides that the
City of Galveston, as a governing body of a municipality, cannot enter
into a lease for the pier with a term in excess of forty years from the date
of the lease. 213
The original lease for the Flagship Hotel was executed on May 20,
1963, with a commencement date of January 18, 1966 and a term of forty
years, expiring on January 18, 2006. An amendment to the lease was exe-
cuted on January 28, 1981, which granted the tenant the option to renew
the lease for three additional five-year periods (if exercised, the lease
would expire on January 18, 2021, which is thirty-nine years, eleven
months and twenty days from the date of the second amendment). The
lease was amended by a fourth amendment executed in May 1988, which
granted the tenant the option to renew the lease for five additional five-
year periods (if exercised, the lease would expire on January 18, 2031,
which is forty-two years and seven months from the date of the fourth
amendment). The lease was further amended by a fifth amendment in
August 1993, which limited the tenant's right to exercise the five addi-
tional five-year renewal options by requiring, as a condition precedent to
exercising such options, that the tenant spend $250,000 on improvements
to the hotel. If the renewal options were exercised, the lease would still
expire on January 18, 2031, but this would be thirty-seven years and five
months from the date of the fifth amendment, as opposed to forty-two
years and seven months from the date of the fourth amendment.
The court held that the lease expires on January 18, 2031.214 In deter-
mining whether the forty-year limit in section 307.023 of the Texas Gov-
ernment Code was violated, the court held that the date of the
amendment, rather than the date of the lease, should be used to calculate
the term.215 The court's rationale was that new consideration was given
each time the lease was amended. 216 The court held that the intent of the
forty-year limit in section 307.023 is to prevent the city from agreeing to a
commitment that obligates the city for more than forty years. 217 Because
the January 18, 2031 expiration date is less than forty years from the date
of the fifth amendment, the court held that section 307.023 was not vio-
lated. 218 Applying the same rationale, the court held that the fourth
amendment was void because the renewal rights granted therein ex-
tended the term beyond forty years after the date of the fourth amend-
ment.219 However, portions of the fourth amendment were validly
incorporated into the fifth amendment when it was negotiated and exe-
213. Id. at 559-60 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 307.023 (Vernon 1999)).








cuted by the parties.220 Because spending the $250,000 in repairs was a
condition precedent to the exercise of the five additional five-year re-
newal options, those renewal options were incorporated into the lease.
The issue in Lazell v. Stone221 was whether an owner who succeeded to
a lease was liable for the breach of the lease made by the prior owner.
The court of appeals agreed with the controlling principle that a trans-
feree of an interest in leased property will not be liable for any breach
that occurred prior to the date that the transferee acquired its interest.222
However, the court applied the precedent of the Regency 22 3 case and held
that the tenant did have the right to terminate the lease even if the cur-
rent landlord was not liable for the breach.2 24
The Sisters of Charity2 2 5 case involved an implied landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. A member of a health club locked his watch and money in a
locker at the health club while he swam. He sued the health club for
damages after his property was stolen from the locker, on the theory of
bailment. The court of appeals held that a member's storing of personal
property in a locker at a health club creates a landlord-tenant relation-
ship, rather than a bailment.226 The health club owner, as the lessor, had
the duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises (the locker) but had
no duty to exercise care regarding the property stored on the premises.22 7
Therefore, the health club owner was not responsible for the property
stolen from the locker.228
There were also several cases decided during the reporting period re-
lating to residential leases. The Urena229 case and the Kukis230 case both
involved premises liability issues.
In Urena, a tenant of an apartment complex sued her landlord after her
son was sexually assaulted by another tenant of the complex. Though the
facts here are different from those in the Timberwalk231 case
(Timberwalk involved a rape of a tenant by a non-tenant and the facts
here involve the sexual assault of a tenant by another tenant), the court
of appeals nonetheless held that Timberwalk applied and provided the
necessary requirements to establish a duty to protect invitees from crimi-
220. Id.
221. 123 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
222. Id. at 11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 16.1(3) (1977)).
223. Regency Advantage Ltd. P'ship v. Bingo Idea-Watauga, Inc., 936 S.W.2d 275, 277
(Tex. 1996).
224. Id.
225. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, Houston v. Meaux, 122 S.W.3d 428 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).
226. Id. at 432 (citing Marsh v. Am. Locker Co., 72 A.2d 343, 345-46 (N.J. App. Div.
1950)).
227. Id. at 431-32.
228. Id. at 432-33.
229. Urena v. W. Invs., Inc., 122 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
granted), rev'd, No. 83-0919, 2005 WL 783879 (Tex. Apr. 8, 2005) .
230. Kukis v. Newman, 123 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.).
231. Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998).
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nal acts of a third person.232
Applying the law in Timberwalk, the court held that the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the landlord was not proper be-
cause genuine issues of material fact existed as to the determination of
whether the landlord owed Urena a legal duty to protect her and her
family from criminal acts of third parties and as to whether the landlord
used ordinary care to do so. 233
To determine whether an issue of material fact existed, the court cited
the following relevant facts which could have led to foreseeability of the
sexual assault of Urena's son: (i) eight violent crimes occurred at the
apartment complex within a period of less than three years (as compared
to no violent crimes occurring within the ten previous years in the
Timberwalk case); and (ii) the crimes (attempted sexual assault, robbery,
aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, capital murder, and murder)
were not identical to the one in question, but they were substantially simi-
lar because they were all violent crimes against a person.234
In Kukis, the court of appeals applied the law established in a prior line
of cases, holding that a landlord does not have a duty to tenants or their
invitees for dangerous conditions on the leased premises. 235 Texas courts
have held that there are three exceptions to this general rule: (1) lessor's
negligent repairs; (2) concealed defects of which the lessor was aware
when the premises were leased; and (3) a defect on a portion of the prem-
ises that remained under the lessor's control.236 In this case, the
Newmans leased a house from Kukis. The stairwell did not have a hand-
rail, and the Newmans sued Kukis after Mrs. Newman fell down the stairs
and broke her ankle. The Newmans claimed that the absence of a hand-
rail was a concealed defect and fell within an exception to the general
rule. The court, however, disagreed and held that the absence of a hand-
rail "is not a condition the Newmans would not have had reason to know
or that Kukis would have had reason to suspect the Newmans would not
discover. '237 The holding is similar to the holding in Brownsville Naviga-
tion District v. Izaguirre,238 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that
soil becoming soft and muddy when wet was not a concealed defect.239
The McBeath2 40 case involved interpretation of section 92.202 of the
Texas Property Code. The landlord in McBeath failed to disclose the
name and address of the apartment owner to the tenant when requested
232. Urena, 122 S.W.3d at 253.
233. Id. at 256.
234. Id. at 255.
235. Kukis, 123 S.W.3d at 639 (citing Johnson County Sheriff's Posse v. Endsley, 926
S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex. 1996)).
236. Id. at 639-40 (citing Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 434 n.3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).
237. Id. at 641.
238. 829 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1992).
239. Id. at 160-61.
240. McBeath v. Estrada Oaks Apartments, 135 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
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as required under section 92.201 of the Texas Property Code. Tenant's
notice to the landlord requesting such information indicated that she
"may take legal action" if the landlord did not respond within seven days.
Section 92.202 provides that a landlord is liable to a tenant if the landlord
fails to respond with such information before the eighth day following
written notice from a tenant and the tenant "may exercise remedies
under this subchapter if the landlord does not comply with the request by
the tenant . . . within seven days. '2 41 The landlord in McBeath argued
that the tenant's failure to reference the section of the Texas Property
Code precluded her from recovering damages because she failed to com-
ply with all conditions precedent to recovery set forth in section 92.202.
The court of appeals overruled, holding that the words "may take legal
action" in tenant's notice were sufficient for complying with the require-




In Perkins v. McGehee,24 3 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals focused on
three elements of an adverse possession claim to find that appellees ac-
quired title to a portion of their neighbor's property enclosed by a fence
line. The first factor the court focused on was whether the appellees
identified the claimed land with "reasonable certainty. '24
4 Instead of
simply using the description of the land contained in the deeds of the
parties, the court also relied on maps, aerial photographs, and the lower
court's ruling which stated "appellees have legal title to and are entitled
to possession of the area of real property north of the fence line" to find
that the property was sufficiently identified.
245
The second element the court analyzed was whether appellees actually
appropriated the land.24 6 The appellees relied on the fact that they and
their predecessors in interest had (1) used the property to graze cattle,
(2) repaired and improved the existing fence, and (3) removed trees and
brush from the property. The court reiterated the law with respect to
demonstrating appropriation of property by grazing, stating that the
claimant "must present evidence that he designedly enclosed the land at
issue. ' 247 However, the court also noted that an exception to the de-
signed enclosure standard exists if the claimant can show a sufficient non-
grazing use of the land so that the true owner would have been put on
notice. 24 8 Factors that distinguished this case from other designed enclo-
sure cases included: (1) the tract had been constantly used for grazing;
241. Id. at 697 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.202(a)(2) (Vernon 1995)).
242. Id.
243. 133 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
244. Id. at 291.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 291-93.




(2) the tract was contiguous to the appellees' record title of land and en-
closed within it; (3) appellees' predecessor in interest had rebuilt and re-
placed the fence; and (4) the reputation in the community was that the
tract was part of appellees' property. 24 9 Thus, the court held that the
appellees sufficiently appropriated the land.250
The third and final element the court examined was whether appellees
used the property exclusively. The fact that the appellant's son used the
property for hunting and that appellees failed to post trespassing signs or
other means of excluding people from the property did not alter the fact
that appellees used the property exclusively.25 1 Factors the court consid-
ered included that the appellees told appellant that he could not erect
another fence on the area enclosed within the existing fence and that the
appellees gave appellant's son permission to enter onto the property.2 52
Harlow v. Giles253 also examined various elements of the adverse pos-
session statute. Harlow claimed that he acquired title to two tracts of
land adjacent to Giles' and other land owners' property by adverse pos-
session. The court of appeals first rejected Harlow's claim that his fenc-
ing of the property satisfied the element of actual and visible use.
Because Harlow could not produce evidence concerning the purpose of
the fence, the court ruled that the fence was a casual fence and not de-
signedly enclosed. Harlow's grazing of two sheep and one horse and the
building of a water well on the property was not sufficient to establish
actual and visible use of the property. Also, the fact that Harlow leased
the property to hunters did not persuade the court that such action was
actual and visible appropriation, because the adverse parties were not
aware of such leases. Harlow's payment of taxes on the property was also
not enough for the court to find adverse possession as a matter of law.
Further defeating Harlow's claim that he exclusively used the property
was the fact that the adverse parties also used the property.254
In King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,2 55 the Texas Supreme Court looked at
the controversy involving the title to the King Ranch and whether King
Ranch, Inc. established a valid claim of adverse possession against the
heirs of its one-time co-tenant, Helen Chapman. Chapman's heirs filed a
trespass to try title claim alleging that an earlier judgment in 1883, vesting
title to the King Ranch in Richard King, was void as to them. The King
Ranch responded that it acquired title by adverse possession.256
The court stated that a "co-tenant may not adversely possess against
another co-tenant unless it clearly appears he has repudiated the title of




253. 132 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied).
254. Id. at 647-50.
255. 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003).
256. Id. at 745-57.
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his co-tenant and is holding adversely to it. ' '25 7 The court noted that, in
most instances, repudiation is a fact question but in some cases, such as in
this case, it can be established as a matter of law. In this instance, it was
undisputed that Richard King repudiated the title of his co-tenant Helen
Chapman, with Chapman admitting in her 1879 original petition that
King "entered upon said premises and ejected . . . petitioner there-
from. ''2 58 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the original judgment
quieting title in Richard King was a clear act of ouster and that repudia-
tion occurred no later than the day the judgment was entered.
259
The King Ranch case also presented evidence on the remaining ele-
ments of adverse possession, and the court held as a matter of law that it
established its use and cultivation of the land for over one-hundred years.
The court went on to admonish the lower court for holding that a genuine
fact issue existed as to King Ranch's use of the property and that such
holdings "frustrated the policy behind our adverse possession statutes" of
settling title disputes.
2 60
In Martin v. Amerman,261 the Supreme Court of Texas clarified
whether disputes over boundaries are to be tried as a trespass to try title
claim or could also be brought under a declaratory judgment action. The
supreme court noted that because the trespass to try title action requires
strict pleadings and proof requirements in order to prevail, the supreme
court lessened those requirements when the issue was solely one involv-
ing a boundary dispute. However, the supreme court had never intended
to create a distinct cause of action for boundary disputes. The supreme
court held that even though the dispute was over the boundary of two
properties, such boundary disputes necessarily involve title.2 62 Therefore,
the action must be brought under the trespass to try title theory.2 63 The
supreme court also took steps to retract its dicta in Brainard v. State
264
that a "declaratory judgment is one way to resolve a boundary dis-
pute. ' 265 Lower courts' decisions that relied on such dicta were also
disapproved. 2 66
In Witcher v. Bennett,267 the court of appeals held that before a party
who has held possession of property as a permissive tenant or tenant at
sufferance can begin to adversely possess the property, he or she must
first overtly repudiate the tenancy. In this case, a judgment had been
entered against Witcher in a trespass to try title suit in 1987 concerning
the disputed land, but despite such judgment, Witcher remained in pos-
257. Id. at 756.
258. Id. at 757.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004).
262. Id. at 267.
263. Id.
264. 12 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. 1999).
265. Id. at 267-68 (quoting Brainard, 12 S.W.3d at 29).
266. Id. at 268.
267. 120 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
1109Real Property2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
session. In a subsequent suit in 1989, a permanent injunction was entered
against Witcher prohibiting him from entering the property; Witcher con-
tinued to possess the disputed land. The court held that a party who
holds over after an adverse judgment has been rendered against it is
merely a permissive tenant, or a tenant at sufferance, and must repudiate
such tenancy before he or she can begin to adversely possess such land.
The court found no evidence of such a repudiation in this case.268
X. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
McMillan v. Dooley269 involved a preferential right to purchase an oil
and gas lease. The main issue concerned how such right was treated
when the lease in question was part of a multiple lease conveyance.
Dooley was the holder of the preferential right to purchase an oil and gas
lease reserved out of an assignment of that lease. The assignee eventually
sold the oil and gas lease as part of a package deal along with two other
oil and gas leases. Dooley did not learn of the conveyances until after
they already occurred. When he contacted the new owners of the lease
and informed them of his preferential right to purchase, the new owners
offered to sell all three of the leases to Dooley. However, Dooley, only
wanting to purchase the one lease, asked what the purchase price was for
the one lease but was given only the total purchase price for all three
leases. Dooley eventually filed a lawsuit claiming that the new owners
breached his preferential right to purchase. Plaintiffs Smith and Johnson,
each owners of a preferential purchase right to the other two leases in-
cluded in the package deal, joined in the suit.270
The court of appeals noted that once a conveyance has been made in
violation of a preferential purchase right, the rightholder has an option to
purchase the property according to the terms of the conveyance. The
issues in this case were somewhat difficult because of the package con-
veyance of the three leases. 271
Dooley alleged that he was not required to undertake actions to exer-
cise his right to purchase because the new owners' presentment of the
offer was improper for several reasons. The first reason asserted was that
the presentment did not comply with the express terms in the original
conveyance of the preferential right. The court noted that there is a dis-
tinction between preferential right to purchase agreements, which base
the rightholder's purchase contract on a certain price, and agreements
that base the election on the terms and conditions of the offer to the third
party. In this case, the court held that even though the conveyance stated
that Dooley's offer would be based on the "price" of an offer to a third
party, it was really one that was based on the terms and conditions of the
268. Id. at 923-26.
269. 144 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. filed); see supra notes 108-24 and
accompanying text.
270. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d at 164-69.
271. Id. at 172.
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offer because there was no language that stated it should be so strictly
construed. Therefore, the court held that the current owners' offer to
Dooley was sufficient.
272
Dooley also argued that the presentment of the offer was defective be-
cause the owners' offer included all three leases and did not separate
Dooley's lease from the others. The court held that the owners made a
reasonable presentment because they disclosed the material terms of the
conveyance.
273
Dooley alleged that he was not required to accept the other leases in
order to exercise his right and that he had no obligation to exercise his
right to purchase. The court agreed that Dooley did not have to accept
the other leases in order to exercise his right, given that other Texas cases
held that a rightholder was not allowed to expand his right to purchase
other land not subject to the preferential purchase right. If a right holder
is not allowed to expand his right to purchase, he is also not required to
exercise his right to purchase in regard to property not contemplated in
the right to purchase. However, the court held that Dooley was required
to take affirmative steps to exercise his option to purchase. Because
Dooley rejected the initial offer to purchase all three leases within the
required ten days, his right to purchase expired. To preserve his right to
purchase, a rightholder should inform the seller that he is exercising his
option to purchase subject to the provisions to which he objects. 274
The new owners also argued that they were not subject to the terms of
the preferential purchase rights because they were not parties to the in-
strument that originally conveyed the right. However, the court declined
to accept this argument because the written assignment that assigned the
lease to the new owners was made expressly subject to the instrument
containing the preferential agreement. The court also rejected the new
owners' claims that one of the rightholders, Johnson, no longer possessed
the preferential right because of certain conveyances he had made. The
court reasoned that Johnson was, at one point, both the lessor and the
lessee of the mineral interest in the property. Later, as lessee, Johnson
reserved the preferential purchase right out of his assignment of the
lease. The court held that Johnson's various conveyances of his interests
in the surface of the land and the minerals and other real property inter-
ests arose out of his relationship as owner/lessor of the land and not as
lessee. Thus, his conveyance of these real property interests did not con-
vey any contractual right affecting the property, and he still held the pref-
erential purchase right.275
In H.H. Holloway Trust v. Outpost Estates Civic Club Inc.,276 the pri-
mary issue was whether two lots in a subdivision fell within the deed re-
272. Id. at 174-77.
273. Id. at 177.
274. Id. at 178-81.
275. Id. at 182-85.
276. 135 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
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strictions for that subdivision. The Holloway Trust wished to use the two
lots it purchased in a subdivision for commercial purposes but was in-
formed that the lots were subject to deed restrictions that limited the uses
of the lots to residential purposes. The Holloway Trust argued that be-
cause the original deed from the original owners did not specify where
the deed restrictions were filed, the lots could not be bound by the deed
restrictions. The court of appeals noted that this was not a case in which
the restrictions were mentioned just as a general statement but instead
involved a specific statement by the grantor. 277 Even though the actual
place of filing the deed restrictions was incomplete in the deed, the state-
ment "SAID LOT IS RESTRICTED IN ITS . . ." was enough to put
future purchasers on notice that the lots were subject to the
restrictions.2 78
In Dickey v. McComb Development Co., Inc.,279 the Dickeys entered
into a contract for deed for the purchase of land. After making payments
on the property for eight years, the Dickeys received notice from Mc-
Comb that they were late on a payment and that if they failed to cure
such failure by July 13, 2000, the contract would be terminated. The pay-
ment was received one day late and the contract was terminated.280
On appeal, the Dickeys argued that they were protected by sections
5.061 and 5.063 of the Texas Property Code, which mandate a sixty-day
cure period before a seller may enforce forfeiture of purchaser's interest
in the property if: (i) at least twenty percent of the purchase price has
been paid; and (ii) the property is used as a residence. 281 Because twenty
percent of the purchase price had been paid, the only issue on appeal was
whether the Dickeys used the property as their residence. 282 Factors con-
sidered by the court of appeals in determining that the Dickeys did not
live at the property included the fact that the Dickeys: (i) did not live on
the property at the time of the late payment; (ii) had attempted to sell the
property; (iii) leased the property to a third person; (iv) did not receive
mail at the property; (v) had the homestead designation removed from
the property; and (vi) could not produce evidence of any definite plans to
return to the property. 283 Therefore, it was determined that the Dickeys
were not entitled to the protection of section 5.061 of the Property
Code. 284 The court also held that McComb had not accepted the late
payment as cure for the default.285 The concurring opinion noted that
this case exemplifies the serious problem with Texas law that allows pur-
chasers under contracts for deeds to lose all interest in a nonresidential
277. Id. at 754-56.
278. Id. at 755-56.
279. 115 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); see supra notes 146-49 and
accompanying text.
280. Dickey, 115 S.W.3d at 44.
281. Id. at 45.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 45-46.
284. Id. at 46.
285. Id.
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property simply because one payment is one day late.286
XI. EASEMENTS
In LaTaste Enterprises v. City of Addison,287 the court of appeals con-
firmed that an easement by estoppel can only be created if the owner of
the servient estate actually represents to the dominant estate owner that
there is an easement. Appellants, owners of lots close to Addison Air-
port, asserted that they had an easement by estoppel to use the airport
free of charge. The court focused on the fact that the owner of the air-
port never promised or represented to the appellants that they had free
use of the airport. The court ruled that the fact that some of the appel-
lants did use the airport freely for years is not evidence that actual repre-
sentations were made by the owner of the airport. Also, the fact that a
brochure provided by the airport promises access to the airport was not,
in the court's view, a representation that the owners would have free ac-
cess. However, the court did hold that one appellant presented some evi-
dence of a representation by stating that, at the time of the purchase of
his property, he was promised free access to the airport. The court fur-
ther found that this individual relied on this promise and evidence of that
reliance could be found in the fact that he built improvements, even if
such improvements were built on the dominant estate. The court also
held that there was no implied easement because the appellants could not
prove unity of ownership at the time of severance of the dominant and
servient estates. 288
Koelsch v. Industrial Gas Supply Corp.289 analyzed the interpretation
of the language that granted Industrial an easement for gas pipelines over
Koelsch's property. The instrument gave Industrial's predecessor in in-
terest an easement to "lay, operate, renew, alter, inspect and maintain
two pipe lines ... upon, over, under and through the following described
land." 290 The instrument also stated that "Grantee agrees to bury such
pipe lines. '291 The Koelsches brought the action against Industrial be-
cause a block valve assembly, which was a necessary safety feature of the
pipe line, was located above ground on their property. The court of ap-
peals, however, stated that the right to build the block valve above
ground was naturally encompassed by the plain language of the convey-
ance and was necessary for enjoyment of the easement. The court stated
that this meaning also harmonized with the granting instrument because
it would not make sense to require every item necessary for the operation
of the pipelines to be buried. To hold that anything associated with the
easement must be buried would render the first clause of the granting
286. Id. at 47 (Stone, J., concurring).
287. 115 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
288. Id. at 732-39.
289. 132 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).





XII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS AND
OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
Brooks v. Northglen Association293 involved a residential property
owners' association in Houston governed by chapter 204 of the Texas
Property Code. The case involved the interpretation of section
204.010(a)(16) of the Texas Property Code, which allows an owners' asso-
ciation to cumulatively increase assessments in one year, effectively pro-
viding for a "catch-up" if assessments had not been increased for a period
of years. However, this cumulative increase is only permitted if the re-
strictions allow for annual increases without a vote of the members and if
not otherwise provided by the restrictions.2 94 The case turned on the ap-
plication of the "unless otherwise provided by the restrictions" limitation.
The court narrowly construed the powers of an owners' association to
cumulatively increase assessments pursuant to this statute by holding that
the owners' association's attempt to cumulatively increase assessments
was not allowed because the restrictions tied the annual allowed increase
to an escalator over the prior year's assessment. 295 The reference in the
escalation provision to the prior year's assessment was sufficient for the
court to find that the restrictions addressed (and prohibited) cumulative
increases, trumping the applicability of the statute. 296
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court also upheld a challenge to the
constitutionality of section 204.010(a)(10) of the Texas Property Code,
which allows an association to charge a late fee on past due assessments,
unless otherwise provided by the restrictions.297 The supreme court
found that this statute did not violate the Contracts Clause of the United
States or Texas Constitutions, in that it did not substantially impair the
contract and that it is a proper exercise of the State's police power. The
supreme court further held that the owners' association could not fore-
close on the homestead of a property owner for its failure to pay late
charges assessed pursuant to this statute. Although foreclosure is availa-
ble on a homestead for failure to pay assessments under deed restrictions,
the supreme court distinguished these late charges because they were not
created by the deed restrictions. 298
In Cimarron County Property Owners Association v. Keen,299 the court
of appeals applied the doctrine of quasi estoppel to allow homeowners to
pursue activities from their home that were specifically prohibited by the
deed restrictions. The restrictions at issue prohibited homeowners from
292. Id. at 497-99.
293. 141 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. 2004).
294. Id. at 160-66.
295. Id. at 166-68.
296. Id. at 168.
297. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 204.010 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
298. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 168-71.
299. 117 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no pet.).
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establishing any business operation in their home. The homeowners re-
quested permission from the owners' association to run a day-care center
from a home shortly after moving into a residence subject to the deed
restrictions. The owners' association approved the request, subject to
compliance with certain conditions, including no outside employees. The
doctrine of quasi estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another
party's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken
by such party when it would be unconscionable to allow such party to
maintain that position inconsistent with one to which that party acqui-
esced. Quasi estoppel also requires that the party claiming reliance on
the position of the other party show that harm would result if the other
party's previous position was enforced. The court found that the ele-
ments of quasi estoppel were present because of the correspondence
from the homeowners' association in which the association allowed the
business use as long as certain conditions were satisfied, and the home-
owners relied on this position when purchasing their home and starting
their business. 300
In Myer v. Cuevas,30 1 an individual condominium unit owner sued
members of the board of directors of the condominium association alleg-
ing various causes of action, including mismanagement of corporate as-
sets and breach of fiduciary duty relating to actions of the board in
expending assessments for the maintenance of the common elements of
the condominium and allegedly expending assessments for their personal
benefit. 302 The trial court dismissed the case on the basis that the individ-
ual unit owner lacked standing to sue. The court of appeals affirmed be-
cause: (1) one owner cannot recover damages to land owned in common
without joining the other co-owners in the suit (unless the joinder of all
co-owners would be impractical); (2) the directors owe a fiduciary duty to
the corporations they serve, but not to the individual shareholders
(homeowners); and (3) when a corporation suffers injustice at the hands
of the board, only the corporation has standing to sue, even though an
individual owner may be injured.30 3 The court analyzed section 81.201(b)
of the Texas Property Code and concluded that it establishes that the
owners' association has standing to institute litigation on behalf of two or
more owners concerning a matter related to the common elements of the
condominium, but it does not establish standing for individual unit own-
ers to maintain such a cause of action.304
In Anderson v. New Property Owners' Association of Newport, Inc. ,305
the plaintiff attempted to enforce the denial of a plan to modify a home-
owner's driveway. The plaintiff purportedly acted as the architectural
control committee. The court of appeals held that such entity did not
300. Id. at 511-13.
301. 119 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
302. Id. at 832.
303. Id. at 833-36.
304. Id. at 835 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.210(b) (Vernon 1995)).
305. 122 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
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have the rights of the architectural control committee at the time in ques-
tion; therefore, it did not have standing to enforce its purported denial of
the plan approval. After a series of transfers and a bankruptcy affecting
the initial developer of the subdivision and its successors in ownership of
undeveloped lots, the plaintiff contended that the rights of the architec-
tural control committee vested in it. However, the court disagreed, find-
ing that the assignment document relied upon by the plaintiff did not
explicitly and specifically assign to it the right to act as architectural con-
trol committee. 30 6 The court held that section 202.004(b) of the Texas
Property Code did give the plaintiff the right, as a representative desig-
nated by an owner of real property affected by the deed restrictions, to
bring a suit to enforce the deed restrictions, but did not give the plaintiff
the right to act as the architectural control committee in approving or
disapproving plans. 307 The appeals court also found Section 204.011(b) of
the Texas Property Code, which allows for automatic vesting of an archi-
tectural control committee's authority in the property association upon
the occurrence of certain events, to be inapplicable under the facts of this
case because the plaintiff was not the acting property association at the
relevant time. The plaintiff did become the acting property association
by virtue of a proper amendment to the deed restrictions, replacing the
original organization established by the original developer, but this did
not occur until after the request for approval of the driveway at issue in
this case was submitted and denied by the plaintiff.30 8 The court did find
in favor of the plaintiff on the homeowner's claim for attorney's fees
under section 5.006(a) of the Texas Property Code, which provides that
"[iln an action based on breach of a restrictive covenant pertaining to real
property, the court shall allow to a prevailing party who asserted the ac-
tion reasonable attorney's fees . . ." because the homeowner was not the
party that asserted the action for breach of a restrictive covenant. 30 9
XIII. HOMESTEAD
In Pelt v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association,310 the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Article XVI,
§ 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) of the Texas Constitution requires lenders to provide
borrowers with signed copies of all loan documents signed at closing, or
whether unsigned copies of such documents satisfy the constitutional re-
quirement, the violation of which results in a forfeiture of all principal
and interest by the lender. In this case, the plaintiffs obtained a home
equity loan from the defendant bank's predecessor. The plaintiffs ceased
306. Id. at 382-90.
307. Id. at 388; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.004(b) (Vernon 1995) (providing in
part that "[a] property owners' association or other representative designated by an owner
of real property may initiate, defend ... in litigation or an administrative proceeding af-
fecting the enforcement of restrictive covenant ... .
308. Anderson, 122 S.W.3d at 389-90.
309. Id. at 390 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.006(a) (Vernon 1984)).
310. 359 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2004).
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making payments on the loan, and the defendant bank initiated foreclo-
sure proceedings in state court. 311 Plaintiffs brought a diversity action in
federal court alleging that the lender failed to comply with Article XVI,
§ 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) of the Texas Constitution, which "requires that the
lender provide the borrower copies of all documents signed at the
closing." 312
The district court instructed the jury that "[t]he Texas Constitution re-
quires that 'a copy of all documents signed by the owner' be provided."
It does not state that the owner be provided "a signed copy. '3 13 The
court of appeals agreed with the district court's plain language interpreta-
tion of the Texas Constitution, holding that the borrower need not be
provided with a signed copy of all documents signed by the borrower at
closing; the court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that the policy of
Texas courts to liberally construe statutes and constitutional provisions in
favor of homestead owners should influence the court's interpretation of
the constitutional provision at issue. The court reasoned that the bor-
rower would not be harmed in any way by this interpretation because the
borrower is to receive accurate copies of the loan documents. The court
stated, "the copies given [must] be accurate facsimiles of the loan docu-
ments." 314 In other words, the copies provided must include all altera-
tions between the form provided to the borrower and the documents
executed by the borrower. 31 5
A Texas court considered a case during this Survey period involving a
purported renewal and extension of a lien secured by the borrower's
homestead. In Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Cook,316 the East-
land Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the
lender's lien was void and unenforceable as a lien against the borrower's
homestead.
In that case, a 1999 deed of trust purported to renew and extend a 1992
purchase money deed of trust against a homestead. However, the note
secured by the 1992 deed of trust was paid and a release of lien was exe-
cuted in 1996. The court concluded that "parties cannot create a lien
against a homestead by purporting to renew and extend a prior lien that
has been dissolved by payment. '317 The appellant sought to amend its
claim asserting that the extension and renewal provision in the deed of
trust be reformed to reflect the mutual mistake of the parties in improp-
erly describing the lien to be renewed and extended, which the appellant
claimed was not the purchase money lien. The appellant claimed that it
was instead a lien in favor of Jim Walter Homes securing the construction
of the home on the property, which appellant contended was paid off
311. Id. at 766.
312. Id. at 767 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(v)).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 768.
315. Id. at 767-68.
316. 141 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.).
317. Id. at 714.
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with the proceeds of its loan. The trial court denied the application to
amend the claim as prejudicial and untimely. The court of appeals af-
firmed and further rejected appellant's subrogation claim with respect to
such lien because it failed to plead such theory in the trial court, and even
if properly pleaded, the court stated that such theory was unsupported by
the evidence. 318
The appellant also argued that the retention-of-benefits rule applied to
this case, as the appellees were simultaneously attempting to repudiate
the 1999 deed of trust while keeping the disbursements of the loan se-
cured by that instrument. The court held that the rule did not apply be-
cause the note remained enforceable, albeit unsecured.319
XIV. BROKERS
There were no noteworthy cases on this topic during the Survey period.
XV. TITLE INSURANCE
There were no noteworthy cases on this topic during the Survey period.
XVI. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, MECHANICS' LIENS
AND CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
The Texas Supreme Court recognized the validity of pass-through
claims brought by contractors on behalf of subcontractors in Interstate
Contracting Corporation v. City of Dallas.320 A pass-through claim exists
when a subcontractor lacks privity of contract to sue an owner directly, so
the contractor sues the owner on behalf of the subcontractor. Under the
typical pass-through liquidation agreement, the subcontractor releases
the contractor from liability if the contractor files the subcontractor's
claim against the owner and agrees to remit any recovery to the subcon-
tractor. In Interstate, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
asked the Texas Supreme Court certified questions regarding whether
Texas recognizes pass-through claims, and if so, what requirements exist
for a contractor to bring a pass-through claim on behalf of a subcontrac-
tor. In Interstate, the City of Dallas refused to pay a claim submitted by
Interstate Contracting Corporation ("ICC"), the contractor, on behalf of
Mine Services, Inc. ("MSI"), a subcontractor, for expenses incurred by
MSI in the production of fill material. ICC sued the City of Dallas on
behalf of MSI to collect the money owed. The prior rule in Texas was
that in such circumstances, a subcontractor needed to sue the contractor
for payment, and the contractor would then need to sue the owner.321
The supreme court noted that the matter presented "difficult issues of
318. Id. at 711-17.
319. Id. at 717-18.
320. 135 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2004).
321. Id. at 607-10.
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first impression for this Court. '322 The supreme court ruled that Texas
now recognizes pass-through claims for three reasons. First, pass-through
claims are common practice in the construction industry, and federal case
law and eighteen of the nineteen states that had reviewed the matter rec-
ognized the validity of pass-through claims. Second, pass-through claims
protect subcontractors against breaches of contract by an owner, where
an owner refuses to pay a legitimate bill submitted by a contractor.
Third, pass-through claims promote judicial economy by eliminating the
need for suits by a subcontractor against a contractor, and then a contrac-
tor against an owner.323 The supreme court held that in order for a con-
tractor to bring a pass-through claim, the contractor must be liable to the
subcontractor at the time the claim is brought. The supreme court
respected the industry standard liquidation agreement as satisfying this
test. The supreme court did not address the city's contention that a
waiver of sovereign immunity by the city is a condition to recovery, as
this question was not properly presented in the case.
324
In Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit,325 the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether a contractor can sue a regional transportation authority
created under chapter 452 of the Texas Transportation Code for breach of
contract without first submitting its claim to the authority's administrative
process. The court noted this was "a question of first impression in
Texas" due to the fact that the administrative procedures were not
promulgated by statute, but rather the statute delegated the right to the
authority to promulgate the administrative process. 32 6 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's ruling that Eby must exhaust DART's adminis-
trative remedies before suing in court.327 In Eby, a construction company
("Eby") was awarded a contract to build part of the DART rail system in
downtown Dallas. Eby commenced work in June 2002 and immediately
ran into delays, which Eby alleged were due to design deficiencies and
inaccuracies in the plans DART provided as part of the bid solicitation
process. The contract Eby entered into with DART contained a provi-
sion mandating that Eby must exhaust its remedies under DART's self-
created administrative process for resolving disputes before seeking judi-
cial review for any disputes arising under the contract. Instead of ex-
hausting its administrative remedies, Eby sued DART in district court for
breach of contract and misrepresentation. The district court dismissed
Eby's claims, in part because Eby failed to exhaust its remedies under
DART's administrative procedures. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting
that Eby must first exhaust its remedies under the administrative process
for resolving contract disputes created by DART before suing in court
322. Id. at 607.
323. Id. at 619.
324. Id. at 619-20.
325. 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004).
326. Id. at 468.
327. Id. at 472.
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because the Texas Legislature delegated to DART the authority to create
administrative procedures to resolve disputes with DART's contractors;
Eby expressly agreed to submit any disputes to such process. 32 8 The Fifth
Circuit disagreed with the district court on one matter, however. The dis-
trict court dismissed Eby's misrepresentation claim as a tort claim barred
by governmental immunity. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the misrepresen-
tation claim was a contractual claim that must be submitted to DART's
administrative process. 329 A question not addressed by the court was
whether the enabling statute in chapter 452 of the Texas Transportation
Code provides a waiver of immunity of regional transportation authori-
ties from suit, as any such suit would not arise until the administrative
process has run its course.
In In re First Texas Homes, Inc.,330 the Supreme Court of Texas, with-
out hearing oral argument, overruled the lower court decision that certain
claims brought by the homeowners against their homebuilder were not
subject to arbitration, even though the contract between them provided
that all disputes arising between them were subject to binding arbitra-
tion.331 April and Cornell Greene purchased a home built by First Texas
Homes, Inc. The purchase contract contained a provision stating that all
disputes between the parties would be submitted to binding arbitration.
Upon finding problems with their house, the Greenes sued First Texas
Homes in court alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud,
negligence, violations of the DTPA, violations of the Texas Fair Housing
Act, violations of the federal Fair Housing Act, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The lower court ordered that all claims be submit-
ted to arbitration except the claims for violation of the Texas and federal
Fair Housing Acts and any claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress arising after the parties signed the purchase contract. The Texas
Supreme Court overruled the lower court and ordered that all of the
Greene's claims be submitted to arbitration as they were all covered by
the broad arbitration provision in the contract. The supreme court noted
that the arbitration provision was enforceable because it was not pro-
cured by fraud and was not otherwise unconscionable. 332
XVII. CONDEMNATION
This section covers cases involving the acquisition of property by gov-
ernmental entities for use as a public purpose.
328. Id. at 470-72.
329. Id. at 471-72.
330. 120 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2003).
331. This case arose prior to the effectiveness of The Texas Residential Construction
Commission Act, codified in chapter 401 of the Texas Property Code and the related signif-
icant amendments to the Residential Construction Liability Act, Texas Property Code
Chapter 27, both of which became effective for causes of action accruing after September
1, 2003. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 401-38, 27.001-.007 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
332. In re First Texas Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d at 868-70.
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In a case exploring the pre-condemnation requirement that the con-
demning authority and the subject property owner are unable to agree on
damages, the Texas Supreme Court found that the authorities satisfied
the requirement.333 In Hubenak v. San Jacinto- Transmission Co.,3
34 it
was held that the "unable to agree" requirement was not jurisdictional
and that the condemning entities satisfied this requirement by making
offers to purchase the property.335 The supreme court held that the
amount of such offer and whether or not the offer was expressly rejected
by the property owner is not relevant to this determination. In holding
that the "unable to agree" requirement is not jurisdictional, the supreme
court noted that the proper remedy in the event of the failure of this
requirement to be met is abatement of the proceeding until the require-
ment that the parties "are unable to agree" has been satisfied.336
In Coble v. City of Mansfield,337 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals re-
viewed a claim by a landowner that he was entitled to additional damages
in contemplation of a future requirement to erect a screening wall and
landscaping. The property owner asserted that upon condemnation of
the subject right-of-way and installation of a highway, the property owner
would be required to install a retaining wall pursuant to city ordinances if
the property was developed as a residential subdivision. The court con-
cluded that the property owner was not entitled to damages equaling the
projected cost of the retaining wall and landscaping because the land-
owner's property was not platted for residential use, and therefore, it was
speculative as to whether the additional costs would be incurred. 338 The
court did not address whether the ordinance requiring the screening wall
and landscaping would constitute a regulatory taking upon the develop-
ment of the property for residential use, as it held that such issue was not
ripe for adjudication. 339
XVIII. AD VALOREM TAXATION
On an issue of first impression, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that a "possibility of reverter" interest in property is not a taxable interest
subject to a tax lien. In Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District v.
Glenn W. Loggins, Inc.,340 the property was held subject to a possibility
of reverter that was determined to be an interest in property, rather than
a claim, and thus could not be extinguished by a tax foreclosure sale.
34 1
Because the interest was non-taxable, the court reasoned that the interest
could not be divested for delinquency in real estate taxes; therefore, any
333. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012 (Vernon 2004).
334. 141 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. 2004).
335. Id. at 175.
336. Id. at 174-84.
337. 134 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
338. Id. at 451.
339. Id. at 458.
340. 115 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied).
341. Id. at 70-71.
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purchaser of the subject property at a tax sale took title subject to the
possibility of reverter.342
In the matter of Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P. v Matagorda County
Appraisal District,343 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reviewed the
narrow question of whether underground natural gas storage domes were
subject to appraisal (and taxation) separate from the surface land. The
court reversed the lower court decision and held that the salt caverns
used for gas storage were not improvements to the land or an estate or
interest in land (such as a mineral interest) and therefore were not sub-
ject to separate tax assessment. 344
In Whitehead v. Jasper County Water Control and Improvement District
No. 1, 3 4 5 the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a re-
demption deed obtained by a taxpayer. The case involved property that
was obtained by the taxing entity at a tax foreclosure sale, but subse-
quently redeemed by the taxpayer. Only after issuance of the redemp-
tion deed was it discovered that a mistake was made regarding the
existence of improvements on the subject tract. The court found that any
mistake in the original tax judgment would not be transformed into a
right to rescind the redemption deed and denied the taxing authority's
request for rescission of the redemption deed based upon the mistake.346
WHM Properties, Inc. v. Dallas County 3 4 7 focused upon whether the
taxing authorities had presented sufficient evidence to trigger a presump-
tion of delivery of notice of tax delinquency. Upon a review of the re-
cord, it was determined that no evidence existed that the authorities ever
mailed the challenged notices, and the trial court's entry of judgment in
favor of the taxing authorities upholding penalties and interest on the
delinquent taxes was reversed. 34 8 Aldine Independent School District v.
Ogg349 also addressed the cancellation of penalties and interest on delin-
quent taxes pursuant to the since amended section 33.04 of the Texas Tax
Code. In this case, the court held that the evidence was not sufficient to
show that the taxing authorities sent certain of the required notices of
delinquency nor sent timely tax bills for certain years; therefore, the cor-
responding penalties and interest were not collectible by the taxing
authorities. 350
An issue of proper valuation methodology was raised in Houston R.E.
342. Id. at 73.
343. 118 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. granted).
344. Id. at 468-69.
345. 118 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).
346. Id. at 486-87.
347. 119 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).
348. The version of TEX. TAX CODE § 33.04 in effect at the time provided that penalties
and interest on taxes delinquent more than five years are cancelled if the collector has not
delivered the required notice. The provision at issue was subsequently repealed. Id. at
327; see Act of June 19, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1481, § 16, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1481.
349. 122 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
350. Id. at 271-72.
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Income v. Waller County Appraisal District.351 The Houston Court of Ap-
peals reviewed the appropriateness of "blending" two valuation ap-
proaches. The trial court blended the income and market sales
approaches to value. The reviewing court found that such a blending of
two accepted approaches produced relevant and reliable evidence of mar-
ket value, and further, that the trial court's finding of value was within the
range of evidence presented by the expert witnesses. 352
A review of the application of the ten percent cap on increases in
homestead valuation was the subject of Bader v. Dallas Central Appraisal
District.353 In Bader, the homeowner alleged that the statutory cap on
value increases applied separately to the improvement value and the land
value so that neither component could increase more than ten percent in
one year. The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed and found that the stat-
utory cap applied to the overall market value and not the individual com-
ponents of that value.354
In Travis Central Appraisal District v. Signature Flight Support
Corp.,355 it was held that improvements located on public property were
entitled to a tax exemption. The opinion addressed the taxation of lease-
hold improvements located on airport property owned by a municipality
that were leased to ground lessees under long-term ground leases. The
improvements were constructed by the ground lessees on the public prop-
erty, but title to the improvements had vested in the municipality pursu-
ant to the terms of the lease. The court concluded that the municipality
owned the improvements and that they were exempt from taxation be-
cause of their use for a public purpose as part of a public transportation
facility owned by the city.356 Had the improvements been owned by the
lessees, they would not have been tax exempt.3 57 The leasehold interest
in this case was not subject to taxation because the property was being
used for a public purpose as part of a public transportation facility owned
by the city.358
XIX. ENTITIES
In McDowell v. McDowell,35 9 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court determination that a partnership existed between brothers James
and Greg McDowell, and therefore, James owed Greg fifty percent of the
proceeds of the sale of the partnership property. The partnership prop-
erty consisted of a tract of land originally owned by a corporation whose
351. 123 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
352. Id. at 860-62.
353. 139 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
354. Id. at 783.
355. 140 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
356. Id. at 838-45; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
357. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
358. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 140 S.W.3d at 838-45; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 25.07 (Vernon 2001).
359. 143 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
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principals were James, Greg and their mother. Several years later it be-
came necessary for the land to be held in the name of a single person, so
Greg and his mother transferred their interests to James. Greg claimed,
at the time of the transfer, that the parties agreed he would be a silent
partner, but when the property was later sold, James denied the existence
of a partnership and refused to pay fifty percent of the proceeds to Greg.
James asserted that two essential elements of a partnership were missing:
an agreement to share losses and participation in control of the business.
In reviewing the Texas Revised Partnership Act, the court found that al-
though these are two elements of a partnership, no one factor is disposi-
tive and the intent of the parties as to whether a partnership exists is a
key consideration. 360 In fact, the two brothers held themselves out as
partners in their tax returns, in which they split income and expenses
from the partnership property equally. There was ample evidence for the
trial court's finding that a partnership existed between the two brothers;
therefore, the decision was upheld. 361
In Potter v. GMP, L.L.C.,362 the court affirmed a jury verdict in favor
of GMP in an action for breach of contract against one of its members,
Bertie Potter, who refused to comply with a capital contribution call. Pot-
ter and two other men formed GMP, which served as the general partner
of two limited partnership entities established for the operation of a
quarry. In 2001, GMP made a capital contribution call on all members
for additional operational funds. Potter refused to contribute, asserting
that the regulations of GMP provided that capital contributions were not
mandatory on members who objected. GMP asserted that the regula-
tions were clear that if the majority in interest of the members agree to
the capital call, then it is mandatory on all. The court held that the regu-
lations were ambiguous; therefore, it was proper to submit to the jury the
issue of whether the capital contribution call was mandatory. Because
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination, the ver-
dict was upheld.363
In Harris v. Archer,364 Harris, Archer and Sterquell formed a partner-
ship to purchase an airport building. Several disputes arose among the
partners, and at one point Harris attempted to sell his partnership inter-
est to Archer's brother, contingent on Sterquell doing the same. How-
ever, Sterquell refused to sell his interest. Archer then began to
unilaterally negotiate the sale of the airport building to a third party, but
he did not disclose the negotiations to his partners. Instead, Archer ne-
gotiated an agreement to buy out Harris's and Sterquell's partnership in-
terests. Archer then immediately sold the building to the third party and
refused to share the profits with his former partners. Sterquell and Harris
360. Id. at 129; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6132b-2.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005)
(listing five factors a court can consider in determining whether a partnership exists).
361. McDowell, 143 S.W.3d at 126-30.
362. 141 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. dism'd).
363. Id. at 700-03
364. 134 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).
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sued Archer for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and Archer counter-
claimed to rescind the partnership on the basis that he was fraudulently
induced to enter the partnership. After a lengthy recitation of the facts
and discussion of the procedural history of the case, the court rejected
Archer's fraudulent inducement claim, finding that such claim was
waived because Archer subsequently ratified the partnership agreement
by his actions in furtherance of the partnership with knowledge of the
issues forming the basis of his fraudulent inducement claim.365 The court
further found that Archer owed Sterquell and Harris a fiduciary duty to
disclose the negotiations of the potential sale of the building. The court
found that the fiduciary duty claim was not released in the settlement and
release agreement executed by Sterquell and Harris in connection with
the sale of their partnership interests to Archer. This was the result be-
cause they lacked knowledge of the negotiations for the sale of the part-
nership property, and a breach of fiduciary duty claim for nondisclosure
of material information will not be deemed to be released absent the ex-
press intent in the release to cover such claim.366
XX. INDEMNITIES
In ABB Kraftwerke Aktiengesellschaft v. Brownsville Barge & Crane,
Inc.,367 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling upholding a
contractual indemnity agreement in a negligence case. ABB arranged for
the shipment of a generator through an intermediary that contracted with
Brownsville Barge to handle the shipment. The intermediary and
Brownsville Barge executed a Lifting Services Agreement related to the
shipment. Before the generator was lifted onto the barge, Brownsville
Barge informed ABB that it would not perform the lift unless ABB
signed an indemnity agreement, attached as an exhibit to the Lifting Ser-
vices Agreement, that included indemnification for the negligence of
Brownsville Barge. ABB signed the indemnity agreement. During the
lift, a longshoreman was killed when a jacking plate fell from the genera-
tor. The longshoreman's family sued for wrongful death, and the lawsuit
was settled. Brownsville Barge filed a cross-claim against ABB, asserting
that ABB was obligated to indemnify it for the legal fees from the law-
suit. The trial court found in favor of Brownsville Barge.368
On appeal, ABB claimed the indemnity agreement was unenforceable
because it was not signed by Brownsville Barge, and there was no consid-
eration for the agreement. The court found that the indemnity agree-
ment was a binding contract even though it was not executed by
Brownsville Barge. The court relied on the principle of contract law that
a signature is not required on a contract to make it effective as long as the
365. Id. at 427-28.
366. Id. at 430-31.
367. 115 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied).
368. Id. at 289-90.
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party has given its consent to the terms of the contract.369 ABB's lack of
consideration argument was predicated on its assertion that Brownsville
Barge was already obligated to perform the lift pursuant to the Lifting
Services Agreement. 370 However, the court construed the Lifting Ser-
vices Agreement not to be an obligation to perform the services, but
rather the framework for the performance of the services should Browns-
ville Barge subsequently agree to perform the services. Therefore,
Brownsville Barge's agreement to perform the lift services served as con-
sideration for the indemnity.371 The court also found that the indemnifi-
cation for Brownsville Barge's negligence satisfied the fair notice
requirements of the express negligence doctrine and conspicuousness
requirement. 372
SpawGlass, Inc. v. E.T. Services, Inc.373 illustrated the application of
the express negligence rule. The case involved a construction contract
between SpawGlass, the contractor, and ET Services (ETS), the subcon-
tractor. The contract contained an indemnification of the contractor by
the subcontractor, expressly including claims arising from the contractor's
negligence. An employee of ETS was injured on the job and sued Spaw-
Glass for negligence. The contractor filed a third-party claim against ETS
based on the indemnity contained in the contract. The court found that
the express negligence rule was satisfied because the intent stated in the
four corners of the indemnity provision included claims of injury by vir-
tue of the contractor's negligence. Therefore, the court reversed the trial




In City of Dallas v. Jennings,375 the Jenningses brought suit against the
City of Dallas to recover damage caused by a backup in a city sewer line
that resulted in the flooding of their house with raw sewage. The Jen-
ningses sought recovery for their damages on a takings theory under Arti-
cle 1, section 17 of the Texas Constitution and alternatively as a nuisance.
Negligence was not an issue in this case. Instead, the Jenningses claimed
that occasional flooding damage is inherent in the operation of any sewer
system and that the city should bear the cost of such damage. At issue in
the takings claim was the type of intent that must be shown. The Jen-
ningses argued that intent to commit the act is all that is required, while
the city countered that intent to cause the damage must be shown. 376 The
369. Id. at 291-92.
370. Id. at 293.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. 143 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
374. Id. at 899-901.
375. 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004).
376. Id. at 311-12.
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Texas Supreme Court held that a governmental entity may be liable
under Article 1, Section 17 for damage to property caused by it in order
to confer a public benefit "if it (1) knows that a specific act is causing
identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific property damage is sub-
stantially certain to result from an authorized government action."'377 In
this case, there was no substantial certainty that the work performed by
the city in unclogging a blocked sewer main would cause a backup in
another portion of the sewer system and result in flooding of the Jen-
ningses house with raw sewage.378 The plaintiffs' nuisance claim also
failed because the supreme court held that in order to recover, the gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity must be expressly waived.379 The supreme
court stated that nuisance is not an independent exception to sovereign
immunity and absent an express waiver, immunity can only be waived by
operation of the Tort Claims Act (which did not apply to this situation) or
by establishment of a takings claim.380 Because the nuisance did not rise
to the level of a constitutional taking, the Jenningses could not recover on
their nuisance claim. 381 The court held that the court of appeals erred in
reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City.382
In Coyne v. Kaufnan County,383 the court of appeals followed the Jen-
nings ruling on a similar claim where the plaintiffs sought recovery on
both taking and nuisance theories. Some of the plaintiff's claims related
to the county's failure to pave and widen the county roads at issue and
implement traffic control measures to prevent trucks from damaging their
adjacent property. The court characterized these claims of omission as
negligence claims; negligence claims, according to the court, cannot form
the basis of a takings claim because this would conflict with a governmen-
tal entity's general immunity for its negligence. 384 As to the plaintiffs'
claims relating to use of the roads by the county's trucks and the county's
maintenance of the roads, the court stated that these acts of commission
could support nuisance and takings claims under Jennings. There was a
factual question as to whether the county knew that damage to the plain-
tiff's property for a public purpose would be a substantially certain result
of the county's actions.385 The court reversed the trial court's grant of




In American Home Assurance Co., Inc. v. Unauthorized Practice of
377. Id. at 314.
378. Id. at 315.
379. Id. at 315-16.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 316.
383. 144 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.).
384. Id. at 135-36.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 136.
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Law Committee,387 the court was faced with the issue of whether insur-
ance companies were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by us-
ing staff attorneys to represent their insureds. There was no dispute that
the staff attorneys were properly licensed to practice law. The court held
that because the insurance companies had a direct financial interest in the
matter, the use of staff attorneys to represent insureds does not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law. 388 The court reasoned that an insurance
company is seeking to protect its own interests when it provides a staff
attorney to the insured (much like any company using attorneys it di-
rectly employs to defend a claim against itself), and although the triparty
relationship among attorney, insurance company, and insured may create
conflicts of interest, such conflicts can be properly handled by other eth-
ics rules and do not elevate the activity to the unauthorized practice of
law. 389 The court rejected the UPLC's argument that the insurance com-
pany's right to control the details of the work of staff attorneys creates an
irreconcilable conflict with the interests of the insureds, noting that an
employee attorney does not owe an absolute duty of loyalty to his or her
employer. Further, the court held that such an arrangement has long
been acknowledged by Texas courts and has not been prohibited by the
Texas Legislature. 390
C. MINERALS
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool,39 1 involved long-standing
oil and gas leases dating back to the 1920's and 1930's that contained
typical provisions that the leases remain in effect as long as oil or gas is
produced. The factfinder determined that there were several periods of
nonproduction throughout the years, that ranged in length from thirty
days to 153 days. The lower court ruled in favor of the lessors and held
that the leases terminated due to cessation of production, and the court
awarded damages. The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The supreme
court did not reach the issue of whether the periods of cessation in pro-
duction were reasonable so as to keep the leases in force under the tem-
porary cessation of production doctrine, but rather held that, even if the
leases had been terminated, the lessees acquired the same property inter-
est under an adverse possession theory. The supreme court's adverse
possession determination focused on the "hostile" requirement. It rea-
soned that notice of hostile possession must be brought home to the title-
holder; however, such notice need not be actual notice. The supreme
court stated that long-continued use can serve as such constructive notice,
as in this case. The interest acquired by the lessees by adverse possession
was a fee simple determinable interest in the mineral estate, which is the
387. 121 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. granted).
388. Id. at 842.
389. Id. at 836.
390. Id. at 839-40.
391. 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003).
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same interest the lessees had under the oil and gas lease. 3 92
D. TRESPASS
In Mehan v. Wamco XXVIII, Ltd.,393 the court held that a secured
party does not commit trespass on another's land by failing to exercise its
"discretionary" right to foreclose its security interest in or repossess col-
lateral located on another's land. In this case, Wamco held a security
interest in inventory located on Mehan's land. Mehan and Wamco's
predecessor were both originally secured creditors with respect to the
land and the inventory. Mehan had a first priority security interest in the
land and a second priority security interest in the inventory, while
Wamco's predecessor had a first priority security interest in the inven-
tory. Mehan foreclosed its security interests in the land and the inven-
tory, taking the inventory subject to Wamco's prior security interest. The
court upheld the trial court's order allowing Wamco to hold a sale of the
inventory on Mehan's land, which required Wamco to pay rent to Mehan
during the period of such entry. 394
E. Lis PENDENS
In In re Fitzmaurice,395 the purchasers of lots in a subdivision filed tort
and contract claims against the developer alleging that the developer was
responsible for or made representations regarding the construction of
amenities, including lakes, a recreational park and retention pond. One
of the property owners filed a lis pendens against all remaining property
owned by the developer. The court of appeals, citing existing case law,
stated that the use of lis pendens has been disapproved where only collat-
eral questions are involved that might ultimately affect an interest in the
property. 396 In this case, the lot purchasers were not maintaining an ac-
tion involving title to the subject property, the establishment of an inter-
est in the subject property, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against
the subject property. The lot owners did not identify any specific prop-
erty where the alleged amenities were to be built. Their assertion that a
constructive trust be imposed on all remaining property owned by the
developer to secure their tort and contract claims is no more than a col-
lateral interest in the property. 397 As such, the court found that there was
no adequate nexus existing between the claims of the lot purchasers and
the property as to which the lis pendens was filed. Therefore, the court
ordered the cancellation of the lis pendens. 398
392. Id. at 195-97.
393. 138 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
394. Id. at 419.
395. 141 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
396. Id. at 803.
397. Id. at 804.




In Werthmann v. City of Fort Worth,399 property owners brought an
action challenging the city's authority to annex approximately 7,744 acres.
The owners alleged that the city failed to prepare an annexation plan as
required by section 43.052(c) of the Texas Local Government Code. The
city asserted that the property owners did not have standing to challenge
the annexation and that only the state could challenge the action pursu-
ant to a quo warranto proceeding. The court cited existing case law in
stating that an action attacking the validity of a city's annexation of terri-
tory for irregular use of power must be brought by a quo warranto pro-
ceeding unless the annexation is wholly void. The State must bring an
action in quo warranto to avoid the specter of numerous suits by private
citizens. Private parties can challenge an annexation only when the an-
nexation is void because the municipality exceeds its authority to an-
nex.400 Typically, Texas courts hold that an annexation exceeds a
municipality's authority when the annexation (1) exceeds the statutory
limits on size, (2) attempts to annex areas within the jurisdiction of an-
other city, (3) attempts to annex areas not contiguous with city limits, and
(4) attempts to annex an area within an open boundary area.40 ' The
court concluded that the grounds asserted by the property owners, i.e. the
city's failure to prepare an annexation plan, relate to procedural matters
and do not question the city's inherent authority to annex. As such, the
court found the property owners lacked standing to challenge the
annexation.40 2
In City of Missouri City v. City of Alvin, 40 3 the State of Texas brought a
quo warranto action against Missouri City alleging that the city illegally
extended its incorporated area by annexing land that was contiguous to
municipal territory that was less than one-thousand feet wide at its nar-
rowest point.40 4 This case involved the interpretation of section 43.0545
of the Texas Local Government Code, which states in relevant part that
"[a] municipality may not annex an area that is located in the extraterri-
torial jurisdiction of the municipality only because the area is contiguous
to municipal territory that is less than 1,000 feet in width at its narrowest
point. '40 5 Missouri City argued that the language "because the area"
modifies the verb "annex," thus because it had another reason for annex-
ing the land, namely a need for developing that area, the city did not
violate the section. The state argued that the language modifies the verb
"is located," and because the annexed land extended from a strip of land
in Missouri City that is only twenty-five feet wide, the annexation violates
the statute. The court found that the legislature enacted this statute to
399. 121 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
400. Id. at 805.
401. Id. at 806.
402. Id. at 807.
403. 123 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
404. Id. at 608-09.
405. Id. at 609.
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curb abuse of power by cities in annexing long narrow strips of land.
Therefore, it must be the case that the state has the correct interpretation
because it would always be the case that a city has more than one reason
for annexing a strip of land, and thus would never violate this section,
leaving the section pointless. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court's ruling in favor of the state declaring the Missouri City annexation
ordinance null and void.
40 6
G. PREMISES LIABILITY
Urena v. Western Investments, Inc. 407 was a case addressing whether a
landlord is liable to a tenant for injury due to criminal activity in an apart-
ment complex. Urena and her minor children were residents of the Front
Royale Apartment Complex. One day, Urena left her children with her
sister, who also lived in the Front Royale Apartment Complex, while she
worked. While playing outside of her sister's apartment, Urena's son de-
cided to return to their apartment to retrieve some toys and was lured
into an apartment occupied by another tenant, where he was sexually as-
saulted. The court of appeals stated that generally, there is no legal duty
to protect another from the criminal acts of a third party, however, an
exception to this general rule is where a landlord retains control over
security and safety of the premises.40 8 In such a case, a landlord has a
duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from criminal acts if the risk
of criminal conduct is so great that it is both unreasonable and foresee-
able.40 9 The court set forth five factors in determining whether the crime
was foreseeable: (1) whether any criminal conduct occurred at or near the
property; (2) how recently the conduct occurred; (3) how often it oc-
curred; (4) how similar the prior conduct was to the conduct on the prop-
erty; and (5) what publicity was given to the occurrences. 410 In this
instance, evidence was presented that there were a number of violent
crimes that occurred within a period of three years, that the landlord had
actual knowledge of many of those crimes, and that the landlord had ter-
minated and not replaced its security company. The court held that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the crime at issue was
reasonably foreseeable and as to whether the landlord exercised ordinary
care to protect the tenants from such harm.411
In Howard v. East Texas Baptist University,412 while visiting an outdoor
swimming pool owned by East Texas Baptist University (ETBU), a pri-
vate university that was open to public use for a nominal fee, Howard was
injured when the diving board "double bounced." Howard sued ETBU
406. Id. at 614-16.
407. 122 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. granted), rev'd, No. 83-
0919, 2005 WL 783879 (Tex. Apr. 8, 2005).
408. Id. at 254.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 255-56.
412. 122 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
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for premises liability. At issue was the applicable standard of care.
ETBU argued that the Texas Recreational Use Statute413 applied, which
dictates that the standard of care is that owed by a landowner to a tres-
passer; thus, ETBU would only be liable for injuries incurred through its
willful, wanton or grossly negligent conduct. Howard contended that the
Texas Recreational Use Statute did not apply because it is only applicable
to an owner that charges for entry to its premises, where the total charges
collected for the previous calendar year for all recreational uses of the
entire premises are not more than twice the total amount of ad valorem
taxes imposed on the premises for the previous calendar year. 414 ETBU
contended that the relevant issue was the ad valorem taxes for the entire
property owned by ETBU, while Howard contended that the ad valorem
taxes collected on the area around the swimming pool, which was zero,
was the relevant inquiry. The court of appeals found that the statute was
intended to include the entire premises and not just the area of the swim-
ming pool, reasoning that to rule as Howard proposed would be contrary
to the legislative intent to make such land available to the public for rec-
reational purposes by providing the owners of such land with a lower
standard of care. Given that finding, the court found that there was no
evidence presented to the trial court suggesting ETBU was grossly negli-
gent because, while it knew that there were problems with the diving
board shifting, no one had ever been hurt or even complained. 415
In Villegas v. Texas Department of Transportation,416 passengers in an
automobile brought a claim against the Texas Department of Transporta-
tion (TxDOT) as a result of injuries sustained when their vehicle spun out
of control after hitting water on the roadway, which the plaintiffs alleged
resulted from improper drainage caused by the state's failure to keep the
grass along the road properly mowed. As a state agency, TxDOT is im-
mune from suit unless its sovereign immunity is waived. The Texas Tort
Claims Act creates a limited waiver of sovereign immunity when injury is
caused by a premises defect.417 The court of appeals determined that the
water on the road was not a "special" defect (which would have resulted
in a higher duty of care), but because it was neither unexpected nor unu-
sual for a motorist to encounter a pool of water on a roadway after a rain,
it was a "premises" defect. Therefore TxDOT owed Villegas the same
duty that a private landowner owes to a licensee.418 To establish liability,
a licensee must prove that: "(1) a condition of the premises created an
unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee; (2) the owner actually knew of
the condition; (3) the licensee did not actually know of the condition;
413. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(c) (Vernon 2005).
414. Id. § 75.003(c)(2). The statute was subsequently amended, effective as to causes of
action accruing on or after September 1, 2003, providing that the statute applies if revenues
are not more than twenty times ad valorem taxes.
415. Howard, 122 S.W.3d at 408-12.
416. 120 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied).
417. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §101.022(a) (Vernon 2005).
418. Villegas, 120 S.W.3d at 30-33.
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(4) the owner failed to exercise ordinary care to protect the licensee from
danger, and (5) the owner's failure was a proximate cause of the injury to
licensee. '4 19 The court determined that in this case, Villegas failed to
provide any evidence that TxDOT had actual knowledge that there was
water on the roadway, which was a necessary element to establish a duty
of care for TxDOT. Therefore, TxDOT was entitled to summary
judgment. 420
Similarly, in Taylor v. Wood County,421 motorists were driving on a
county road shortly after a rain storm when they drove into a four to six
foot deep hole where a culvert beneath the road had washed out. In or-
der to be held liable, the county must have waived sovereign immunity.
As in Villegas, the Texas Tort Claims Act creates a waiver of immunity for
premises defects. However, unlike in Villegas the culvert washout was a
"special" defect.422 A special defect is defined to include "excavations or
obstructions on highways, roads, or streets. ' 423 "For a condition to rise to
the level of a special defect ... it must not only present a threat to the
ordinary user of a roadway, but the danger must also be unexpected and
unusual. '42 4 In this case, the evidence conclusively established the cul-
vert washout was a special defect because, unlike a pothole or rut, this
collapse left an impassable hole. Where a claim arises because of a spe-
cial defect, the agency owes the same duty as owed to an invitee of the
owner of a private premises, which requires the owner to use ordinary
care to protect an invitee from a dangerous condition of which the owner
is or reasonably should be aware. The court of appeals found that the
county did not have actual notice of the problem nor should it reasonably
have known of the problem by virtue of the work it performed on a cul-
vert in the same area two months before. Therefore, the county did not
breach any duty to Taylor with respect to this condition.
425
In M. 0. Dental Lab v. Rape,426 Rape brought a premises liability claim
against a land owner after she slipped and fell on mud on the sidewalk of
the property. The parties do not contest that Rape was an invitee of the
property owner. To prevail in a premises liability claim, the invitee must
prove, among other elements (including knowledge and exercise of ordi-
nary care), that a condition on the premises posed an unreasonable risk
of harm to the invitee. The Texas Supreme Court held that mud which
accumulates naturally on a manmade surface does not pose an unreason-
able risk of harm. 427 The court stated that holding otherwise would sub-
ject landowners to a significant burden that could not be mitigated by
419. Id. at 34-35.
420. Id. at 34.
421. 133 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
422. Id. at 813.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 814-15.
426. 139 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2004).
427. Id. at 676.
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precautions and that invitees are at least as aware of the presence of mud
after rain as landowners are.428
428. Id.
